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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to construct an explanatory 
framework for the assessment of Soviet leadership attitudes 
to arms control and disarmament negotiations and treaties. 
The purpose is to establish the objectives and motives of 
the Soviet Union's arms control and disarmament policies. 
These objectives and motives are then categorized according 
to seriousness of intent to conclude agreements with 
potential enemies.
Six explanatory variables have been chosen as most 
likely determinants of the Soviet Union's policy and are 
employed on a chronological basis with sections divided 
according to change of leadership. A conclusion on the 
relative explanatory value of each variable is made at the 
end of each section. The general conclusion draws together 
the observable data to identify the most dynamic 
determinants of the Soviet Union's arms control policy and 
to identify necessary over sufficient conditions for the 
successful conclusion of negotiations.
The results suggest that parity of military 
capabilities is the necessary condition for agreements to 
be signed. Military inferiority will lead the USSR to 
engage in negotiations while building up her military 
strength. The most persistent objective of engaging in 
negotiations with serious intent is the pressing need to 
divert scarce resources to civilian sectors of the Soviet 
economy.
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* » i.x
This study attempts to construct a general framework to assess 
the motives and attitudes of the Russian/Soviet leadership from 1899 
to 1987 relating to the issues of arms control and disarmament. Due to 
the lack of relevant data points, the sometimes obsessive secrecy of 
the Soviet decision-making process, and the imprecision of assessing 
the relative influence of relevant factors on that process, one must 
first acknowledge that conclusions will be somewhat tentative and 
conjectural in nature. Research on a specific aspect of foreign policy 
must also attempt to identify how that aspect fits into the overall 
objectives of policy without incorporating an overwhelming array of 
interacting factors. Conclusions will therefore be suggestive rather 
than predictive.
Ihis study will lay stress on tendencies rather than interests 
within the Soviet leadership in an attempt to identify the conditions 
in which any leader builds a coalition for the promotion of arms 
control and disarmament policy. Apart from the period of Stalin's 
dictatorial rule, there has been a clear plurality of interests within 
the hierarchical Soviet leadership. The aim of the study is to 
identify first, the underlying motives and justifications for pusuit 
of specific policies, and second, to identify the priority attatched 
to pursuit of those policies.
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3Hie meaningful conduct of arms control and disarmament 
negotiations and the conclusion of agreements is not possible without 
the political will of two or more parties. Since 1945, Soviet foreign 
policy has in many ways been reactive to US policy, but it is beyond 
the scope of this study to identify the coincidence of US and Soviet 
positions except in the obvious instances when common goals and 
interests enabled the signing of key agreements. The focus of this 
study is the Russian and Soviet leadership*s perception of established 
trends in military capabilities, particularly in terms of the concept 
of parity.
The thesis of this study argues that a clear parity of military 
capabilities between the Soviet Union and one or more states perceived 
as threatening is the necessary condition for the USSR to enter into 
negotiations with serious intent and conclude meaningful arms control 
and disarmament agreements. A perceived condition of inferiority of 
military capabilities will most likely lead the USSR to pursue arms 
control and disarmament negotiations whilst building up those 
capabilities. The most dynamic sufficient condition is the persistent 
pressure to divert scarce Soviet resources toward domestic economic 
needs.
Arms control is defined as the substance and process of all 
international negotiations concerned with regulating armaments. (1) 
Disarmament is defined as measures that significantly lower the level 
of armaments. (2) The essential difference between the two is that
4arms control is directed at the regulation and management of a build­
up in military force capabilities between states perceived as 
threatening, whereas disarmament is concerned with halting and 
reversing that build-up, more commonly referred to as an arms race.
A stated aim of 'General and Complete Disarmament1 has been a 
part of official Soviet doctrine since the 1920s. Ihis is why arms 
control is usually referred to in Soviet pronouncements as 'partial 
measures of disarmament.' There are also two Russian phrases for arms 
control which have slightly different connotations: 'Kontrol za
vooruzheniimi' which implies looking after control over armaments, and 
'Kontrol nad vooruzheniimi' which implies sweeping control over 
armaments and suggests authority to order or stop the production of 
weapons. (3) Soviet attitudes to arms control and disarmament will be 
seen to have evolved according to developments in the international 
environment over the course of the century.
Both arms control and disarmament share the features of the 
recognition of a common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation 
and cooperation between potential enemies with respect to their 
military establishments. (4) Both share the objectives of reducing 
the likelihood of war, reducing the damage of war should it break out 
and reducing the economic burden of preparing for war.
These objectives have become particularly pronounced since the 
nuclear arms race began at the end of World War II and provide the 
original impetus to undertake this study, which was an attempt to 
answer the following questions: Why has the record of arms control
5and disarmament treaties been so modest despite the recognition of 
the catastrophically destructive nature of nuclear war? Was there a 
shared commitment to avoid it upon which agreement could be based?
The conduct and substance of arms control and disarmament 
negotiations and agreements in this study are argued to be dependent 
variables of the Soviet Union's military relationship with potential 
enemies in terms of the concept of parity. This is defined as a 
condition of approximate equivalence between military forces. If the 
capabilities of two military forces are equal, then parity exists 
between them, regardless of the specific composition of the forces. 
Arms control and disarmament agreements address the confirmation and 
consolidation of this parity.
Parity can take several forms: It can be based on a regional or
strategic balance of forces, a conventional or nuclear balance of 
forces and a qualitative or quantitative balance of forces, often 
referring to the relative technological features which make up a 
particular balance of forces. There is also a general parity where 
the overall balance of forces are equivalent.
Analysis is undertaken on a chronological basis and begins in 
1899 in order to incorporate the events leading up to World War I and 
the 1917 Revolution with the aim of establishing a contrast, if any, 
between the Tsarist and Bolshevik regimes' conduct of policy. The 
study ends with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 
1987, the first disarmament treaty of modern times.
The study is divided into chapters roughly corresponding to
6changes in the chief executive of Russia/Soviet Union. The first 
covering both Tsar Nicholas II and Lenin and the last covering the 
period from the SALT II Treaty to the INF Treaty which included a 
succession crisis of four different leaders, finally ending with 
Gorbachev. In between, the leaderships of Stalin, Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev are analyzed.
Each chapter is sub-divided into three basic sections. Firstly,
there is a survey of the main arms control events of the period and
the development of negotiating positions is recounted. Secondly, 
there is a detailed analysis of the chief explanatory variables in
light of these events. Thirdly, there is a brief summary of each
variable's relative value in explaining the extent to which the Soviet 
leadership entered into meaningful negotiations with seriousness of 
intent.
Six variables have been chosen to best explain the motivation of 
Russian/Soviet arms control and disarmament negotiating positions and 
policy aims. They constitute the basic framework of analysis and are 
employed wherever applicable in each chapter.
The first is the relative military capability of the USSR with 
reference to the concept of parity. As mentioned above, this factor 
is argued to be the necessary factor which explains the conduct with 
serious intent of negotiations and conclusion of agreements. 
Inferiority of capabilities will dispose the USSR to enter into 
negotiations whilst building up her military strength.
Domestic economic imperatives, particularly in terms of the
7allocation of scarce resources, is the second factor examined as an 
explanatory variable of Soviet negotiating positions. Analysis will 
center on the question of whether the USSR enters into negotiations 
and agreements with the aim of diverting resources from the military 
to the civilian sectors of the economy.
The third variable examined is domestic politics. Is the 
prestige invested in success of arms control negotiations and 
consequent political gains by Soviet leaders a key factor in the 
conduct of those negotiations?
The fourth explanatory variable is propaganda value. Are arms 
control and disarmament positions employed solely for their propaganda 
value? Objectives can be numerous but include the aim of influencing 
public opinion or undermining the political consensus amongst 
potential enemies.
Fear of the consequences of nuclear war is the fifth variable. 
Has fear driven the USSR to assume a positive attitude towards arms 
control and disarmament? This variable is only employed in analysis 
of periods following 1945.
The sixth and final variable is China. Does the USSR enter into 
serious negotiation with the aim of concluding agreements with the aim 
of minimizing the threat posed by China? This factor becomes 
operational after the Sino-Soviet split of 1959.
These variables are employed throughout the study with the aim of 
establishing the Russian and Soviet leaderships* attitudes towards 
arms control. These attitudes are then categorized according to periods
8when the leadership abstains from negotiations, will negotiate without 
intention to conclude agreements, will negotiate with serious 
intention to reach agreement and finally, manages to conclude 
agreements with potential enemies.
Ihis is the framework of. analysis. The first period it is 
applied to is 1899 to 1928 and the leaderships of Tsar Nicholas II and 
Lenin.
CHAPTER I 
FROM TSAR NICHOLAS II TO LENIN
The period 1899 to 1928 was one of immense change for the Russian 
people. The Great War of 1914-1918 unleashed revolutionary forces 
which swept away the Tsarist regime of Nicholas II and led to the 
establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the 
leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Despite the enormity of the change 
in the form and direction of political leadership, Russia and the USSR 
remained a country beset by economic backwardness and social strains. 
Consequently, both regimes required domestic and foreign policies 
which would enhance stability and security whilst minimizing any 
external threat. Negotiations and agreements concerning arms control 
and disarmament was one such foreign policy pursued by both 
leaderships with some success. Possible explanations of the factors 
underlying pursuit of this policy are various, and yet there is a 
consistency in the conduct and objectives of negotiation throughout 
the period. A.W. Rudzinski stated that the first Soviet government 
’adapted to their own ends a time-honored device of the traditional 
foreign policy of many governments including those of Tsarist Russia.' 
(1) It is to that government that I shall turn first.
The period leading to the First World War was characterized by a 
race in armaments between the major European powers, particularly 
Germany and Great Britain. In 1899 and 1907, agreement was reached at 
conferences held at the Hague in the Netherlands dealing with the 
issues of armaments, the conduct of warfare and the management of
9
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disputes between states. On July 29th, 1899, all major world powers 
with the exception of the United States declared the use of both
expanding bullets and asphyxiating or deleterious gases in war
prohibited. Both of these proposals were sponsored by the Russian
delegation. There was also agreement on other conventions for the
conduct of warfare. On October 18th, 1907, agreement was reached on
the prohibition of bombing from the air by hot air balloon, a
convention regulating the laying of submarine mines and the
introduction of compulsory arbitration for international disputes 
through a permanent Court of Arbitration.(2) The Russian desire to
address a greater range of disarmament and arms control issues in
those conferences was opposed by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany. The
limited agreements reached did not forestall war which broke out in 
1914.
It was Tsar Nicholas II of Russia who initiated the 'drive for 
disarmament' when he called for an international peace conference on 
August 24th, 1898. The Tsar's Rescript of that date draws attention 
to the costs of the 'progressive development of existing armaments' 
and the increasing risk of disaster through lack of restraint on this 
process. (3) Particular emphasis was placed on the economic burden 
of the arms race; production of wealth was seen to be paralysed and 
economic progress misdirected through unceasing armament. The agenda 
set by Count Mouraviev for the Hague conferences placed the reduction 
of arms and prohibitions on the use of new weapons and 'explosives of 
a formidable power' as priorities. (4) In calling the conference to 
address such issues, the Tsar's motives were far less altruistic than
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a desire for universal lasting peace. Two profound fears stimulated
the call for negotiations.
In order to offset the considerable military threat posed by
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire on Russia's Western border,
the Tsar immediately entered into a political and military alliance
with France following the demise of a similar treaty with Germany in
1890. This was designed to preserve the 'balance of power' in
continental Europe, a policy which would engage Russia and France in
war against Germany and Austria. By 1898, Europe was engaged in an
arms race which threatened the stability of the balance of power and
the prospect of war loomed ever closer. Russia's military weakness
with regard to Germany and Austria was made more disturbing by the
superiority of Austria's artillery, their new Mannlicher infantry
rifle and the rapidly increasing rate of German armament. (5) The Tsar
perceived a threat which could not be met by the relatively weak
military capabilities of Russian power.
Second to Russia's relative military weakness was the economic
burden necessary for Russia to develop her own armaments in line with
those of her Western neighbors. The exposure of Tsarist rule to the
test of war was considered a strain that the Russian economy and
society could not bear without risk of revolution. This was the
prophetic analysis of Jean de Block, a Tsarist Counsellor of State, in
his book 'The Future War from the Technical, Economic and Political
Point of View' published in 1897. In it, he stated:
the destructiveness of modem warfare, with its frightful 
new weapons, becomes so appalling that a general European 
War would bring the universal bankruptcy of nations and 
threatens social revolution in almost every country in 
Europe. (6)
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His suggestion to the Tsar, in light of the economic and social 
burdens of war, Russia's technical backwardness and the dangers to 
peace posed by the shifting balance of power, was to settle disputes 
by arbitration. This was the basis for the Tsar's call for a 
conference to discuss the issues of peace and disarmament in 1899, the 
Tsar's Rescript. The Rescript was an exact copy of Block's 
recommendations but for the omission of the Stated fear of social 
revolution. Nonetheless, the strains of war, after 1944, were too much 
for the Tsarist regime to bear, revolution ensued and the government 
fell.
Lenin on Disarmament
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 established a new regime in 
Russia which was then renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). This new regime was headed by Vladimir I. Lenin. His 
writings and pronouncements during the course of his life provide in 
large part the ideological framework for the organization, conduct and 
aspirations of life within the Soviet Union and its relations with the 
rest of the world - Marxism-Leninism. It is the foremost stated aim of 
the USSR's ruling body - the Communist Party of the Soviet union 
(CPSU) - to lead the proletariat towards Communism in strict adherence 
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Deviation from those
principles was unthinkable. Lenin's impact on the history of the USSR 
is difficult to overestimate. (7)
Whilst the Tsar attempted to stave off war at the Hague 
Conferences, Lenin wrote a pamphlet entitled 'Army and Revolution' in 
1905. In it, he called for the elimination of standing armies and 
their replacement by the armed militia of the people as a whole. His
13
view of disarmament was clearly stated:
Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeoisie dream 
about disarmament. While there is still oppression 
and exploitation on earth, we must strive not for 
disarmament but for universal, popular armament. Only 
it can entirely ensure freedom. (8)
In 1906, Lenin expanded on Clausewitz's belief that war is
nothing but a continuation of policy by non-peaceful means when he
pronounced that great questions in the life of nations are settled
only by force. (9) These were the utterances of a revolutionary who
saw disarmament as counter-revolutionary and a pacifist illusion.
In the immediate pre-revolutionary period of 1916, Lenin wrote
‘The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution* which contained a
section on the 'Slogan of Disarmament'. He writes:
To dream of disarmament was to express utter hopelessness 
about the prospect of revolution.... Every peace program is 
a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless 
its principle object is to explain to the masses the need 
for a revolution. (10)
These pronouncements were consistent with his view that war with the
capitalist states was inevitable. As events were to show, pragmatism
and the security imperatives of the newly bom Soviet State soon took
precedence over revolutionary ideological fervor. Lenin presided over
peace treaties which included disarmament clauses between 1917 and
1921 - a period E.A. Korovine labels 'The Struggle for Peace' (11) -
and went on to endorse disarmament negotiations and policies up to his
death in 1924. (12) This policy remained consistent through to
Stalin's succession late in 1927.
Before analysing the factors which best account for this shift, I
will briefly outline the disarmament and arras control events of the
first years of the Soviet Union.
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The Struggles for Peace and Disarmament.
The Soviet Union signed several peace treaties to end involvement
in World War One, the most significant being the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
with Germany in March 1918. These treaties included clauses for arms
limitation, such as the establishment of a frontier zone with Finland
wherein there would be a limit imposed of 2,500 men on each side with
no artillery. Following this, the Soviet Union became positively
disposed to pursue broad disarmament proposals. However, apart from
signing the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and
bacteriological methods of warfare in 1927, no meaningful agreements
were reached. Soviet arms control and disarmament proposals from 1921
to 1927 were nonetheless numerous and persistent.
Although the USSR was not a party to the Washington naval
Conference of 1922, M. Tchicherin, Soviet Foreign Commissar, stated on
July 19th 1921, *The Russian Government will be happy to welcome any
disarmament as a reduction of the military charges which burden the
workers of all countries.’ (13) At the Genoa conference of 1922,
Tchicherin proposed a general reduction of armaments...
applied to the armies of all countries, and that the 
rules of war are completed by absolute prohibition of 
the most barbarous forms of warfare, such as gas, and 
aerial warfare, and also the means of destruction 
against the non-combatant population. (14)
The proposal was opposed by Britain and France. On May 18th 1922, the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee considered it ’particularly
just and timely that the delegation, when it first took its post at
the conference, proposed general disarmament.' (15) This was the
first time that the Soviet Government had proposed general
disarmament. It was to become a central and recurrent theme in their
15
disarmament and arms control policy.
In December 1923, a Soviet delegation arrived in Rome as part of 
a commit tee to study applications of the principles of the Washington 
agreements. The delegation supported a limit on Soviet tonnage 
reducing it by over a third from 490,000 tons to 280,000 tons. It 
also supported neutralization of the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the 
demilitarization of the Straits of Korea.(16)
In December 1925, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation 
of the Secretary General of the League of Nations to a disarmament 
conference by stating disarmament to be 'the most serious and 
immediate task of all Governments.' (17) In November 1927, Maxim 
Litvinov, the new Foreign Commissar, revealed his plan for general and 
complete disarmament proposing the complete abolition of all armed 
forces on land, at sea and in the air. A detailed draft agreement 
was subsequently put forward outlining the four year program of 
disarmament and a proposal for international supervision of the 
process headed by a commission of control with powers for 'full 
investigation of all activities of the state, of public associations 
and of private persons which are connected with the applications of 
disarmament.' (18) Ihis was a more definite application of the 
principles of investigation set forth in the Protocol of Geneva of 
1924, although the USSR was not a party to the Protocol. The Soviet 
Union's proposal was set out in five chapters and included sixty-three 
articles. However, it was rejected as unworkable. This was the first 
of many such proposals to the League of Nations during the interwar 
years.
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Revolution and Disarmament?
The Soviet struggle for peace and disarmament can be primarily 
explained by the recognition of the USSR's relative weakness in the 
international system at that time. Domestic economic concerns also 
played an influential part in pursuit of disarmament objectives. The 
survival of the infant Bolshevik regime was very much in doubt.
In 1917, Lenin had said,
So much depends on the question of whether we are 
able to delay the war with the capitalist world, which is 
inevitable, but which can be delayed, until the proletarian 
revolution in Europe has ripened or until the colonial 
revolutions are fully ripe, or finally until the capitalists 
fight amongst themselves for shares in the colonies. (19)
Lenin believed that there would be revolutions across Europe
following World War One, but by 1920 he spoke of the necessity of
understanding that the revolutionary tide had temporarily subsided in
Europe and that the USSR must 'stand alone.' (20) Due to the
collapse of the German revolution and the weakness of the new Soviet
regime, a peace treaty would, in the short-term, grant the Soviet
Union breathing space to develop their own forces and enhance the
security of the regime in the face of foreign hostility. The policy
was a means of self- defence aiming to restore peace to the Western
front and establishing demilitarized zones along its borders.
Domestic weakness and the dissipation of revolutionary forces
throughout Europe led to the adoption of a modified foreign policy in
1921. Positive pursuit of a disarmament policy coincided with the
transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the same year. This
was the response to the economic weakness which had to be overcome if
socialism was to survive. In addition to the favorable trade
17
relations expected to be made with capitalist states through contact 
at negotiations, Soviet leaders spoke of the need to transfer the men 
and resources of the Red Army to more productive pursuits. In March 
1922, M. Frunze, Deputy Commissar of War, proposed to the Congress of 
Soviets a 25% reduction of the army. This manpower would become a 
Militia whilst employed in industry. (21) In June 1922, the Moscow 
Disarmament Conference convened and was attended by Estonia, Poland 
and Finland. Maxim Litvinov, Foreign Commissar Tchicherin*s Deputy at 
that time, proposed a reciprocal 25% force reduction. The other 
parties did not agree to this and did so by calling for an initial 
political disarmament, what they called 'moral disarmament.' (22)
Despite failing to reach agreement at the Moscow Conference, the 
Red Army was reduced by 25% in February 1923. Lenin had used the 
negotiations as a means of pressuring the USSR's East European 
neighbors to make the same kinds of manpower reductions already 
planned for the Red Army. In such a manner, he recognized the 
practical utility of disarmament negotiations as a means of promoting 
both national security and economic development. Disarmament policy 
gave the Soviet Union a breathing space in which to increase her 
relative power, forestall another war and induce the capitalist camp 
to reduce its forces.
W.C. Clemens argues that the main aim of the Soviet 'peace 
offensive* at this time was political. It was intended to keep 
capitalism divided and off-balance whilst demonstrating to the masses 
the impossibility of disarmament under capitalism, and consequently 
the need for a Communist revolution. (23) It was an attack on the 
counter-revolutionary forces in the West not possible by other means.
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By championing the issues of peace and disarmament, Lenin's longer 
term aim was to 'isolate the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp from 
the whole of their camp.' (24) Disarmament negotiations were
conducted, and the tone and content of proposals were presented to 
Western powers so that rejection was guaranteed. Thus, these were 
intended to sow the seeds of revolution by exposing capitalist 
governments as militaristic and leading one to conclude that 
disarmament was impossible without the victory of the proletarian 
revolution. In this way, Soviet policy could be seen as a new tactic 
in a grand strategy - defensive in the short term and offensive in the 
long term - of protecting and promoting the USSR's relatively weak 
power in a threatening world arena and as a continuation of the 
revolutionary struggle by other means. (25)
Disarmament policy was also undoubtedly used as a means of 
promoting the Soviet Union as a champion of peace, as a form of 
propaganda. All Soviet negotiations conducted and proposals presented 
since the foundation of the Soviet state have had these aspects to 
them. Whilst this led some Western analysts to conclude that all 
Soviet proposals and negotiations are intended for their propaganda 
value and enhancement of prestige alone, this does not explain shifts 
in Soviet policy orientation and changes in the propensity to conclude 
agreements.
Soviet policy can also be seen as part of a long term Utopian 
ideal to the Soviet leadership. In 1922, Lenin modified his view on 
the inevitability of violent conflict with capitalism. Whilst engaged 
in disarmament and arms control negotiations with Western countries in
19
Genoa, Lausanne and Moscow, he saw agreement, particularly at Genoa,
one of the few chances for the peaceful evolution of 
capitalism to a new structure, an event which we as 
communists have little faith in, but are willing to help 
test. (26)
This provided the basis for a modification of Leninist doctrine 
in the 1950s with Khrushchev's 'Peaceful Coexistence' as the USSR 
entered the nuclear era. Indeed, Lenin was disturbed by the rapid 
rate of advancement in military technology and confided in his wife in 
1918:
contemporary technology is now more and more 
increasing the destructive character of war. But the time 
will come when war will become so destructive that it will in 
general become impossible.
She stated that it was evident how passionately he wanted war to
become impossible. (27) In an interview with H.G. Wells in 1920,
Lenin reportedly said:
if we are able to establish interplanetary connections, 
the potentiality of technology - having become unlimited 
- will put an end to force as a method of progress.(28)
It is clear, however, that disarmament during this time was not a
feasible policy objective for the USSR but rather a short term
defensive tactic and as such, shared many features with Tsarist
policy. This view was shared by A.W. Rudziziski:
Soviet peace policy, like that of Tsarist Russia in 
the 1890s, was necessitated by the clear realization of the 
weakness and vulnerability of the country and of the Soviet 
system and was intended for the protection of the experiment 
of 'socialism' in one country. (29)
CHATTER n  
THE STALIN YEARS
Serious pursuit of arms limitation agreements was a low priority 
for the Soviet Union during the Stalin period. Only during the years 
1928-34 can feasible contemplation of this issue be said to be a 
feature of Soviet foreign policy. Ihe twenty five years of Stalinist 
dictatorship was overshadowed by World War II, the events leading up 
to it and its aftermath. Such disruption and tension in the world 
order left little scope for arms limitation to be viewed as a policy 
of utility and value. Military capability had to be relied upon above 
all things. Two questions must therefore be answered: first, what
motivated Soviet arms limitation policy up to 1934, and second, what 
factors account for disinterest in this policy after 1934. A brief 
examination of arms limitation agreements and additional Soviet 
proposals will provide a background to the central issues under 
review.
Ihe disarmament and arms limitation policies of the Soviet 
Government were conducted up to 1939 by Foreign Commissar Maxim 
Litvinov. He had proposed a plan for general and complete disarmament 
at the League of Nations Preparatory Commission on disarmament in 
1927. This was followed by modified proposals for partial disarmament 
in 1928. This was the basis for his assertion that the Soviet Union 
had ’proposed the most radical forms of disarmament. * (1) These
plans were developed with more detail at the League of Nations World 
Disarmament Conference in 1932, where Litvinov
20
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proposed disarmament on a ’progressive - proportional* principle: 
multilateral force levels would be maintained in relation to each 
other at each stage of disarmament. Therefore, no nation would feel 
disadvantaged during the arms cutting process. The substance and 
wording of these proposals bear a surprising resemblance to those of 
the Tsarist Minister Count Mouraviev at the first Hague Conference of 
1899. However, the main and consistent Soviet orientation was toward 
total disarmament. Proposals from other states in the negotiating 
forums were rejected by the USSR because they did not resolve to go 
far enough toward that end. (2)
By 1934, it was clear that Hitler*s Germany would accept no 
meaningful agreement at the conference. In an unsuccessful attempt to 
salvage something from the meeting, Litvinov proposed to transform it 
into a permanent and regularly assembling ’Conference of Peace. * (3)
There was no success in the field of general arms limitation.
However, there were two successes with specific agreements. The 
first was in March 1931 with the Soviet-Turkish Protocol on Limitation 
of Naval Armaments establishing a mutual neutrality between the two 
nations and maintenance of their Black Sea fleets at existing levels. 
In the protocol, the Soviet Government restated its conviction that 
*the only reliable guarantee of permanent peace is the effective 
reduction of all kinds of existing armaments.* (4) This was 
consistent with the pervading belief that the outbreak of World War 
One was due to the race in armaments and the atmosphere of rivalry and 
mistrust it created. In July 1937, the USSR signed a treaty with 
Britain limiting naval armaments and committing the two nations to
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exchange information concerning naval construction. This extended the 
London Naval Treaty, of 1936 to the USSR. The treaty emphasized 
qualitative restrictions and bound the Soviet Union to a six year 
'holiday', on the construction of cruisers. It did not hold effect for 
long as it included an 'escape clause' for the maintenance of Soviet 
naval levels with the Japanese who had withdrawn from the Washington 
Naval Agreement of 1922 and were embarking upon a major construction 
program.
Together with Britain and the United States, the USSR was party 
to the Moscow Declaration of 1943 which, among other things, addressed 
the issue of disarmament following conclusion of the war. These 
powers hoped to establish and maintain international peace and 
security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic 
resources for armaments. They were also 'to confer and cooperate to 
bring about a practical general agreement with respect to the 
regulation of armaments in the postwar period.' (5)
The Soviet Government issued the Moscow Communique in December 
1945. This called for the control of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes, the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons 
and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means.(6) 
This was agreed to by the US and adopted by the United Nations, 
established earlier that year, but this was the last time that the US 
and USSR agreed on disarmament matters for over a decade.
In June 1946, the US proposed the Baruch Plan for the control of 
atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons. Five days later, 
Andrei Gromyko, then a Deputy Foreign Minister, put forward a Soviet 
plan which called for the immediate destruction of atomic weapons with
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the means for ensuring verification to be a secondary question. The 
Baruch Plan and ensuing Western proposals emphasized establishment of 
institutions of control as the first step to the eventual elimination 
of atomic weapons. In October 1948, the USSR made a concession to the 
effect that atomic weapons be prohibited simultaneously with the 
introduction of institutions of control. In reality, there would have 
been a time lag before controls would become effective. (7) The UN 
adopted the Baruch Plan but Soviet intransigence held up all UN 
attempts to deal with the question and their opposition forestalled 
other attempts to reach agreement on conventional force reductions. 
It was during this time that the Soviet Union consolidated its 
position of dominance in Eastern Europe.
In October 1946, the USSR proposed a general reduction of arms 
including conventional weapons and called for a commission on control 
of these weapons. The resolution was passed unanimously by the UN 
but no progress was made on implementation of the resolution. In 
December 1949, the USSR proposed a one third reduction in all armed 
forces and armament levels but this was rejected by the West because 
Soviet force levels were believed to be well in excess of their own in 
the European theater. In January 1952, the USSR opposed the 
establishment of a UN Disarmament Commission, repeated their proposal 
to simultaneously prohibit atomic weapons and establish institutions 
of control, and called for a percentage cut in conventional forces. 
Joseph Nogee summed up the Western view stating that, by this time, it 
was clear that the Soviet delegation did not have a serious interest 
in reaching any kind of agreement as they ’refused proposals supported 
by the majority view and did not put forward any viable alternatives.1 
(8)
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Behind the Proposals
Clearer than any other period of Soviet history, the 25 years of 
Stalinist rule were ones of dictatorship. Stalin dominated and 
directed the formulation of the domestic and foreign policies of the 
USSR through the most threatening time in its history. The political 
and military environment beyond the reaches of Stalin's rule 
profoundly affected the formulation of these policies. Changes in the 
international situation, particularly in 1933-34, can be seen to have 
altered the value placed on pursuit of arms limitation policies by the 
USSR in the pre-World War II period.
Lenin's position after 1920 had been pragmatic. He would help 
test the feasibility of the peaceful transformation of capitalism. 
Soviet involvement in disarmament negotiations from the early twenties 
was taken seriously, and the process of negotiation begun then 
culminated in Foreign Minister Litvinov's proposals at the Geneva 
Conference of 1932-34 for disarmament to be undertaken on a 
'progressive - proportional' principle. This was an extremely 
significant point in the evolution of Soviet disarmament policy as it 
was the first time that the Soviet Government expressed willingness to 
accept realistic measures for the reduction of armaments as a first 
step to its stated aim of general and complete disarmament, an 
objective rooted in the tenets of Marxism - Leninism. It was this 
concession which differentiates the Soviet position on talks from 1928 
to 1934 from that of the post 1945 period. In the broadest terms, one 
can hypothesize that any shift away from the uncorapromizing call for 
general and complete disarmament in the short term by the USSR reveals
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a relative seriousness of intent to advance negotiations for the 
realization of arms limitation. This was the case from 1932-34 and 
was in contrast to the negotiations held after 1945 and prior to 
Stalin*s death in 1953.
Litvinov had submitted a practical concession to the Geneva
Conference, but at home in the Soviet Union, the hard- line ideology
adopted by Stalin as he consolidated power offered very limited room
for such practicalities and allowed little scope for optimism in the
field of armament reduction as viewed from the West. Ihis hard-line
attitude back in Moscow can be illustrated by a statement from the
Sixth Congress of the Communist International of 1928:
It goes without saying that not a single Communist thought 
for a moment that the imperialist world would accept the 
Soviet disarmament proposals. (9)
Indeed, the view at this time was so uncompromizing that it was
admitted outright that the aim of Soviet proposals was not to spread
pacifist illusions, but *to destroy them.* (10). Stalin himself held
a cynical view towards the ability of treaties and agreements to
forestall conflict. In 1925 he had said:
From the history of Europe, we know that every time 
treaties are concluded concerning the alignment of forces 
for a new war, these treaties are called treaties for peace.
(id
Up to 1934, the Soviet leadership hoped for and awaited a wave of 
revolutions in Western Europe which would avert a direct clash with 
imperialism. These did not take place. Stalin modified Marxist - 
Leninist logic and formulated his theory of 'socialism in one country' 
which placed emphasis on Soviet State interests ahead of 
international revolutionary goals. Events were to prove this
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modification extremely expedient. Economically and militarily, the
Soviet Union*s priorities became strength and self-sufficiency.
The policy of ’socialism in one country* was formulated on the
common ground where ideology met the pragmatic imperatives of the
Soviet state. Stalin realized that the USSR would have to stand alone
and defend itself against any external threat. Forced
collectivization of agriculture and the rapid development of heavy
industry sought to achieve the goals of economic and military self-
sufficiency and strength. Military might was to be based upon
economic power. Accompanying the 1928 Five Year Plan was a plan for
the development of the Red Army. Targets for army strength were
revised upwards in 1929 and 1931 - the aim being that the Red Army
would have no fewer troops than potential enemies and would attain
superiority in decisive types of weapons. (12) Production of arms
and equipment rose rapidly from 1928 to 1933 as Stalin aimed to catch
up with and overtake the capitalist states. (13) In light of this,
how can the increasing militarization of the USSR be reconciled with
serious efforts to conclude arms limitation treaties prior to 1934?
The policy of self reliance was compatible with pursuit of an
active disarmament policy up to 1934. In the aftermath of World War
One, the view persisted that armaments were a primary cause of
international hostility. Litvinov realized that a new conflict in
Europe was impending and threatened unprecedented devastation. At the
World Disarmament Conference of 1932, he stated:
the task of the hour is not the repetition of any 
attempts to achieve some reduction of armaments or war 
budgets...but the actual prevention of war. This task can 
only be carried out by means of total and general 
disarmament. (14)
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As mentioned above, the Soviet Government was willing to accept
partial measures of disarmament and proposed their own progressive -
proportional plan. By 1934, this approach was obsolete due to the
increasing militarism of Nazi Germany and Japan. Litvinov's
suggestion that the Conference be transformed into a regularly
assembling 'Conference of Peace' was an attempt to establish an
instrument for the amelioration of international tensions.
Consistent with the Tsarist regime of Nicholas II and the first
years of the Soviet State, the Soviet Government throughout this
period was fearful and suspicious of the superior military powers
which threatened its borders. Also, it was sensitive to the USSR's
economic and technological backwardness. Stalin's polices aimed to
deal with these factors in unison whilst Litvinov strove for peace
through negotiation in the face of the menace confronting the world
order. Litvinov expressed Soviet fear at the League of Nations
preparatory commission for Disarmament in March of 1928:
Of all the countries represented here, the Soviet is 
the most threatened. It is the object of hostility and ill- 
feeling on the part of the whole bourgeois world. Its 
enemies are legion, its friends few. (15)
Perception of ideological hostility changed to one of direct military
menace from Germany and Japan after 1933.
For the remainder of the 1930s, the USSR pursued alternative
diplomatic policies designed to maintain the status quo and postpone
an armed conflict with the forces of capitalism. In September 1934,
the Soviet Union entered the system of collective security by joining
the League of Nations. In 1935, the USSR hoped to offset the German
threat by concluding treaties of mutual defence with France and
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Czechoslovakia. The naval treaty with Britain in 1937 maintained 
relative naval levels not only with Britain but also Germany, as these 
two nations signed a similar agreement at the same time. Thus, the 
European naval status quo was reinforced.
In order to fortify Soviet neutrality and to give the USSR 
breathing space to build up its own forces, Foreign Ministers Molotov 
and Ribbentrop concluded a Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August 
1939. This was followed by a neutrality act with Japan in April 1941. 
These pacts may have been necessitated by Soviet unpreparedness for 
conflict, especially in light of the massive purges of military 
officers in 1938. It may be the case that Stalin did not intend to 
wipe out his officer corps on the eve of war. Holloway suggests that 
the purges acquired a momentum of their own. (16) Perhaps the total 
surprise with which the German invasion was met suggests that Stalin 
believed that he could keep the USSR out of a major war indefinitely. 
However viewed, Soviet policy sought to avoid conflict, and pursuit of 
disarmament was considered a feasible way to do this before 1934. The 
disarmament policy was a function of relative Soviet military 
inferiority. This inferiority is at the heart of the change in conduct 
of Soviet foreign and disarmament policy from 1934, when the 
alternative policies of collective security, defence and non­
aggression pacts and neutrality acts were pursued more vigorously.
The Gold War,
The US and USSR had much in common in 1945. They had pursued 
isolationist policies in the pre-war period. They had both been 
forced to declare war on their respective enemies due to attacks on 
their territory. They had entered into a close military relationship
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as allies against Nazi Germany which brought both leaderships into 
regular personal contact, and they shared the fruits of victory over 
Hitler in Europe. However, in a matter of months, they were engaged 
in what became known as the 'Cold War.'
For the Soviet Union , the repulsion of Nazi troops from Soviet 
territory and eventual victory exacted a terrible cost of over twenty 
million dead and enormous material destruction of the homeland. The 
development of heavy industry during the 1930s, the mobilization of 
the economy during the war, and five years of postwar reconstruction 
established an industrial base sufficient to support a modem military 
power. The Red Army occupied the countries of Eastern Europe in 
accordance with the Potsdam agreement of 1945. These countries were 
soon consolidated into Soviet satellite states, signalling to the West 
that Soviet political, economic and military influence would remain 
extended to where it met American, British and French troops in 
Western Germany. Mistrust and suspicion of each other's intentions 
led to tension and fear in those conditions and an atmosphere was 
created whereby each side could perceive the other's action and aims 
as threatening. This was the basis of the 'Cold War.'
The Soviet Union considered itself to be the leader of all' 
progressive forces' in the World in 1946. (17) Stalin attempted to
force West Berlin into the Soviet camp with an unsuccessful blockade 
in 1949, and in the same year a new regime friendly to the USSR was 
established in China under Mao Zedong. In 1950 the Soviet Union 
backed forces of North Korea came into conflict with an allied force 
led by the American array supporting the maintenance of a US-backed 
Government in the south of the country.
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These actions, coupled with a profound distaste of communism,
gave substance to American perceptions of the Soviet Union as a threat
to the world order established in 1945, Soviet perceptions were
quite different. By creating a buffer zone in Eastern Europe and
keeping Germany divided, traditional enemies and invasion routes would
lose much of their former menace. This security was seen to be
threatened by the massive post-war American aid of the Marshall Plan
to Western Europe, particularly Germany. Efforts, by the US to prevent
the creation of a buffer zone were viewed by Soviet leaders as an
attempt to keep their country weak. (18) Politically and
economically, the Truman Doctrine expressed US intentions to contain
Soviet influence. Thus, the Soviet Union emerged from the war being
forced to contemplate the hostility of the world's most powerful
nations. Consequently, Soviet leaders felt it necessary to strengthen
their strategic position in view of their relative inferiority
compared to states more economically and technologically advanced.
The same old story but a very new era.
Symbolizing American preeminence as the most powerful nation in
the world following World War II was a monopoly on atomic weapons
technology. Stalin denied that this technology was revolutionary. In
October 1946, he told a Western correspondent:
I do not consider the atomic bomb such a serious force 
as some politicians are inclined to think. Atomic bombs are 
intended to frighten the weak nerved. (19)
Stalin clearly wanted the west to think that the USSR's strategic
thinking was unaffected by the advances in technology.
American use of this technology on Japan was viewed as an attempt
to put pressure on the USSR and remind them of their technological
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and military inferiority. (20) Stalin directed resources to develop 
a Soviet bomb as early as 1943. Molotov stated in November 1945 that 
the Soviet Union 'must equal the achievements of contemporary world 
technology.. .we will have atomic energy and much else.' (21)
Between 1947 and 1953, there were no articles published in the USSR on 
either atomic energy or weapons because recognition of the 
significance of the technology would have affected public and military 
morale and would have acknowledged US success at intimidation. (22) 
The first Soviet bomb was tested in 1949 but the rocket technology to 
deliver these weapons to the US was not developed until 1957. The US 
could launch bombers armed with nuclear weapons in Western Europe to 
attack the USSR, whereas, the USSR did not possess a bomber force 
capable of striking the key strategic areas of the US.
Implications for arms limitation were obvious. Whilst the US had 
a monopoly on this technology, any agreement to ban further 
development as proposed in the Baruch Plan would ensure that this 
monopoly was maintained. The USSR was adamantly opposed to giving up 
the opportunity to develop their own weaponry of this sort. This they 
would forego if all US weapons were destroyed immediately.
The Soviet leadership did not perceive the same threat as did the 
West in uncontrolled national atomic industries and protested all 
attempted 'infringements of national sovereignty' which proposed 
institutions of control in the Baruch Plan were seen to be. (23) 
Negotiating positions revealed a complete lack of interest in reaching 
any sort of agreement which, if signed, would lock-in Soviet strategic 
inferiority so long as nuclear weapons belonged solely to the 
Americans. Stalin had not been consulted during the war about the
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development and use of the bomb and thus saw no grounds for trust in 
the postwar suggestions to establish international control over the 
development and use of atomic energy, (24) Why then did the Soviet 
Union negotiate at all?
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 provided a focus 
for world opinion on the grave issue of atomic energy. The 
representatives of the USSR at the UN sought to court opinion by 
presenting their country as the champion of peace and security as they 
had done in the twenties and thirties. Up to 1949, the USSR was 
opposed to atomic weapons and presented proposals calling for their 
immediate abolition. After 1949, it emphasized the peaceful uses to 
which atomic energy could be applied.
By forcing the Western powers to reject as many Soviet proposals 
as possible, the utility of negotiations as a propaganda weapon could 
be maximized, and in contrast to the pacifist rhetoric of the USSR, 
the US would be viewed as an aggressive nation. Negotiations to 
control the development and proliferation of atomic energy became a 
'propaganda football' of sufficient salience to mobilize world 
opinion, and not only within the UN. (25) In 1950 the USSR 
sponsored a World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Stockholm which 
appealed for a ban on nuclear weapons before the emplacement of 
international controls. Coincidentally, this was the Soviet position 
at the UN.(26)
Active engagement in negotiations at the UN was far more than a 
propaganda exercise. The USSR was still acutely vulnerable to the US 
atomic capability whilst developing its own. By nurturing an image of 
a pacifist power, it was hoped that the will of the US Government and
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general public to actually use the bomb on the USSR would be weakened. 
(27)
Negotiations were also a means whereby the USSR could stall for 
time before its own bomb was developed whilst at the same time 
appearing to contribute to the process of building a safer post-war 
order. The explosion of the first atomic device in September 1949 did 
not mark any sharp change in the tone of negotiations. They were 
overshadowed by the intensity of the Cold War which reached its peak 
at this time. Soviet and American negotiators did not even meet 
socially during the course of the talks. (28)
Introduction of atomic weapons into the Soviet arsenal did not 
alter Stalin's 'Permanently Operating Factors* of strategic doctrine. 
All talk of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons was banned. 
Military thought was regarded as 'the prerogative of the 'leader of 
genius* and not subject to elaboration on a lower level.* (29) This 
elaboration had to wait until after Stalin's death in 1953. It was 
during the Khrushchev era that development of a Soviet nuclear 
doctrine and recognition of the consequences of nuclear war took 
place. Coincidental with these changes was a more favorable 
disposition to arms limitation. As for Stalin's era, the harsh 
military realities of a perceived strategic and military inferiority 
left policies for disarmament with only peripheral value in general to 
Soviet foreign policy, despite enormous increases in economic power 
and military capabilities.
CHAPTER 3 
THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS 1953-1964
Soviet proposals for arras control measures became identifiably 
more serious following the death of Stalin in 1953 and the explosion 
of the USSR’s first thermonuclear device a few months later. There 
were two main diplomatic successes during this period. These were the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the installation of the so called 
’Hot Line' between the Kremlin and Washington. Both were symbols of a 
new detente between the superpowers and the first steps toward more 
comprehensive arms control agreements in the following years. It was 
during this decade that Soviet policy evolved to encompass the notion 
of managing rather than eliminating the arms race. Whilst the USSR 
still predominantly relied on its own military capabilities for 
national security, the nature of its military-strategic and technical 
inferiority in relation to the US underwent an enormous qualitative 
change. This resulted in profound alterations to Soviet strategic 
doctrine and the prevailing ideology of Khrushchev's leadership. 
Recognition of the 'military-technical revolution' which had taken 
place since the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of 
the superpowers provided the impetus and justification for the 
formulation and pursuit of the general Soviet foreign policy of 
'Peaceful Coexistence'. Soviet leaders were forced to realize that 
open conflict with capitalism would result in a catastrophically 
destructive nuclear war, the consequences of which were clearly spelt 
out on numerous occasions - Soviet security was to be best served by 
avoiding nuclear war.
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Arms control and detente policies acquired a new prominence and 
became high priorities for the USSR in accordance with the imperatives 
of the nuclear age. Khrushchev told the 1956 Party Congress that war 
with the Capitalist West was no longer ‘fatalistically inevitable.* 
This was his message to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 
31st, 1959:
It is now clear that it is possible to solve the 
problems confronting the world only if one acts not from a 
position of strength but from a position of reason. These 
questions must be solved with the aid of the only sensible 
method, the method of negotiation. (1)
During this period, arms control negotiations took place on two 
broad fronts. The Soviet Union became the second member of the nuclear 
club in 1949 and moves toward Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties 
can be seen as an attempt to defend this position. Negotiations with 
the United States on control of the race in arms can be sub-divided 
into those dealing with explosives and those dealing with delivery 
vehicles. The USSR first developed its nuclear explosive capability 
in 1949 but did not acquire the means to deliver weapons to the US 
until 1957.
I will firstly deal with Soviet proposals for control of 
explosives and delivery vehicles in negotiations from 1953-64.
In the years following Stalin*s death, particularly in the Spring 
of 1955, there was a fundamental change in outlook with evidence that 
proposals were put forward with 'seriousness of purpose1 and apparent 
feasibility. (2) The USSR announced a series of concessions which in 
several important instances represented a clear acceptance of 
positions that for some years had been vainly advocated by the Western
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powers. Behavior suggested at least the possibility that Moscow 
sought to bridge the gap with the Western position. The style of 
Soviet disarmament diplomacy became more conciliatory and less 
evasive, a definite shift away from Stalin*s sweeping and immediate 
measures. The Soviet leadership appeared to accept the Western 
concept of comprehensive disarmament in stages and showed interest in 
partial measures to safeguard peace and curb the arms race in line 
with the precedent set by Litvinov in 1932.
Briefly, Soviet proposals on controls and force levels were as 
follows: On September 30th 1954, they accepted proposals for a two-
phase cut in conventional arms in one year with nuclear prohibition 
during the second phase. On May 10th, 1955, they proposed ground 
control posts to guard against surprise attack, listed objects of 
control and admitted that past nuclear production could not be 
controlled. On three occasions they renounced the use of nuclear 
weapons - first on the 21st July, 1955, second, on 10th November 1955, 
and third on 7th March, 1956. (3) The major Soviet arms control
proposal in 1956 was made on March 27th and was significant for its 
explicit advocacy of a ’partial measures* approach. (4) It was a 
move from disarmament to arms control as the overriding objective of 
negotiations.
These proposals and the negotiations in which they were presented 
did not end in any sort of agreement. Throughout the discussions, 
neither side addressed itself directly to the other. B.G. Bechhoeffer 
described the process as ’interim sparring.* (5) This was not the 
case in the period 1957-62, during which the Soviets brought forward 
four different versions of comprehensive disarmament dealing with both
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nuclear and conventional weapons, the final stage achieving levels 
sufficient for internal security and fulfilment of UN Charter 
obligations. These proposals were unacceptable to the West in terms 
of verification procedures, timetabling and provisions for the 
elimination of overseas bases in the first or second stage of 
disarmament.
Proposals between late 1956 and August 1957 were particularly
striking for the way in which they backed off from the position
endorsed by Moscow in 1955 and 1956 concerning inspection procedures.
Subsequent proposals until 1962 had the structural defect of proposing
to radically alter the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons.
In 1959, Khrushchev proposed to the UN to put off nuclear disarmament
until the third stage of general disarmament. In March 1962 he
changed this priority to destruction of all nuclear delivery systems
in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.
Between 1960-62, the USSR displayed some awareness of the need
for an international inspectorate to affirm that conditions were ready
for transition from one stage to another. In September 1962, it was
recognized to be desirable for the nuclear powers to retain a limited
number of nuclear weapons after the first stage of disarmament. This
was referred to as the nuclear umbrella scheme.
Agreement was a long way off, as is made clear by Bloomfield:
It can only be concluded that the Soviet position on 
general and complete disarmament, even as amended in 1962, was 
primarily designed for its propaganda effect rather than for 
its negotiability. (6)
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By raid-1961, the optimistic outlook that underlay the shift in Soviet 
arras control policy in 1954-56 had been eroded.
At this time, the focus of negotiations shifted to a ban on 
tests. The Soviet Union had addressed this issue earlier. In 1956, 
they undertook a major drive for test cessation, proposing it on three 
occasions; 12th July, 11th September and 17th October. One month 
later, they accepted the notion of aerial inspection in Europe but 
little progress was made because the talks were overtaken by events in 
Hungary, where Soviet troops quelled a nationalist uprising.
From 1959, the time of the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union 
and subsequently the United States announced a series of test 
raoratoria but actual agreement on the banning of tests was some way 
off. On August 29th and September 3rd, 1962, the Soviet delegate to 
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his 
government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a 
moratorium on underground testing while continuing negotiations on the 
final prohibition of such explosions. On December 19th, Khrushchev 
announced that the Soviet Union would accept 'two to three' on-site 
inspections per year for the control on a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. Moscow also began negotiating a direct communication link - 
the 'Hot Line' - with Washington. Progress was made on April 5th, 
1963, when the Soviet delegate agreed to the US proposals for a link. 
Agreement was reached on June 20th, 1963.
39
On June 10th, it was announced that a 'high-level* conference 
would take place between the US, UK and USSR on July 15th. On July 
2nd, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government was interested in 
concluding a partial test ban treaty and called for the simultaneous 
signing of an East-West non-aggression pact. This was not 
forthcoming, but on August 5th, 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was 
signed prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, on land and in 
the sea. L. Freedman considers this to be the 'first serious arms 
control measure.' (7)
Later in 1963, the USSR accepted safeguards to ensure that 
fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes by 
aid recipients at the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference. 
Also, at the UN, the USSR joined with the US in an agreement on 
certain legal principles covering the exploration and use of outer 
space. Finally, on April 20th, 1964, the US, UK and USSR unilaterally 
pledged to cut back production of fissionable materials.
To summarize, three distinct phases can be seen in the Soviet 
position during the Khrushchev era: The period 1954-57 can be
characterized as a genuine and radical shift toward establishing 
common ground with the West's position. The period 1958-62 was an 
interruption of this movement, though not in terms of testing. The 
1962-64 period was notable for the successes achieved in reaching 
agreement • At this point, it is necessary to establish the reasons 
explaining why agreement was not reached before this time. Answers lie 
in the Soviet quest for national security by its own efforts with arms 
control policies subordinate to and a function of strategic concerns.
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characterized as a genuine and radical shift toward establishing 
common ground with the West’s position.
The Strategic Balance
Entry into the nuclear era did not alter the fact that the Soviet 
leadership was still acutely aware of their strategic inferiority and 
vulnerability in relation to the US. During the 1954-56 period, the 
USSR had achieved substantial progress toward a credible minimum 
deterrent and future developments, especially in the missile field, 
looked even more promising. Such an outlook did not enhance the
possibilities of reaching limited arms control agreements as this 
might have prematurely restricted Soviet freedom of action.
With the development of two strategic bombers, the TU-95 and the 
M-4, the USSR concentrated on emphasizing to the West that they now 
had a capability to deliver the nuclear weapons which had been
developed. This triggered the ’bomber gap* debates of Mid-1955 in 
Washington. This was also a time when the Soviets were rapidly 
advancing their missile and space programs, culminating in a 
successful firing of a multi-stage intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) in August 1957 and the launching of Sputnik 1 on October 6th,
1957. The consensus of both East and West was that the USSR was
moving into a position of military parity with the West and would 
perhaps soon surpass the West in some respects. This prospect was 
greeted with alarm and dispondency in the US as the ’bomber gap* 
debates turned into ’missile gap* panic. Some elements in the US Air 
Force suggested acting against the USSR ’before it’s too late.* (8) 
With regard to disarmament proposals during this period, it is
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doubtful whether the comprehensive plans espoused by the USSR were 
viewed by the Soviet. Union’s leadership as constituting a net gain if 
accepted. Consequently, these plans were propounded with caution. 
(9) In contrast, ’partial measures for disarmament* in terms of 
explosives, not delivery vehicles, appeared to receive serious 
attention from the Soviet leadership at this time with agreements on 
many aspects to be reached finally in 1963-64. The USSR was more 
confident of its longer range ability to negotiate with the West on 
favorable terms once ICBMs became part of its military inventory.
From 1957 to 1960/61, Khrushchev was confident that the Soviet 
Union's military capabilities would be seen to be the equal or better 
of those in the West. He attempted to gain political benefit from 
this apparent development with much emphasis placed on ICBMs in his 
rhetoric at this time. It was a 'single-minded devotion to this 
particular weapon* for which he was criticized after his removal from 
office. (10) So confident was he in the new military capability of 
the USSR that he bragged in 1960 that 'in view of the growth of 
Socialism and the forces of peace, the correlation of forces in the 
international arena has shaped up unfavorably for imperialism.' (11)
In striking contrast to this perception of Soviet power, the USSR 
pursued a policy for a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) at this 
time. It is clear that this was primarily designed for it's 
propaganda effect rather than as a serious basis for negotiation. 
Spanier and Nogee argued in 1962 that 'the Soviet Union has no serious 
interest in disarmament or even in limiting the arms race but utilizes 
the disarmament negotiations solely for propaganda purposes.' (12) As 
Alexander Dallin points out, 'the very process of negotiating -
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whether culminating in agreement or not - bears political dividends by
strengthening an image of the Soviet Union as the champion of peace
and disarmament.* (13) This peace-loving image was designed to be
projected to the West, the developing nations and to the Soviet
population itself.
The GCD plan also reflected a reaction to criticism from the
Chinese who held the orthodox position that partial measures were an
unacceptable accommodation with Capitalism. It can also be seen as
part of a diplomatic tradition going back to the 1920s and an aspect
of the ideological propensity for total solutions.
Bechhoeffer suggests that the Soviet leadership was seeking the
best of all possible worlds by pursuing a * two-pronged* approach - one
prong attempting to gain the political advantages of advocating an
idealistic program of drastic disarmament, the other working toward
partial measures which might be capable of immediate negotiation. (14)
Bearing in mind the growing military, economic and political
power of the USSR at this time, Khrushchev's attitude toward the
threats inherent in the nuclear era centered on the threat of
accidental war:
The position in the world today is a dangerous one 
.... The world has reached a point where war could become 
a fact owing to some stupid accident, such as a technical 
fault in a plane carrying a hydrogen bomb or a mental 
aberration in the pilot behind the controls. (15)
In his memoirs he states that 'any damn fool can start a war, and once
he's done so, even the wisest of men are helpless to stop it —
especially if it's a nuclear war.* (16)
Partial measures included in the GCD plan sought to address this
problem by reducing border tensions wherever the 'spark* that sets off
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war might be generated. An additional concern addressed was fear of
surprise or pre-emptive attack. Khrushchev proposed a non-aggression
pact with NATO and offered agreement on the prevention of surprise
attack by one state upon another.
In 1961, it became evident that the missile gap was in America's
favor. Failings in the Soviet economy also undermined confidence in
Socialism's ultimate victory. The Berlin Crisis of October 1961
concentrated the attention of both the US and USSR on the danger of
deterrence failing. Khrushchev was aware of the Soviet Union's
relative strategic inferiority and hence, the credible ability to
deter Western attack. He was forced to a number of expedients.
First, he emphasized the threat to the members of NATO more
easily reached and destroyed than the US:
If war is launched with present-day weapons, it 
threatens literally catastrophic consequences for the people. 
While this policy is dangerous for all countries it is even 
more hazardous for countries like Britain, France and West 
Germany, with high population densities and relatively small 
areas. The Governments of these countries are risking the 
complete annihilation of every living thing on their 
territory. (17)
Second, he emphasized the ferocity of the explosions of each warhead 
rather than the number of individual explosions. This was a counter 
to the US belief that war, if it came, would be one of controlled 
escalation.
The third rapid solution attempted by Khrushchev was to place
medium-range missiles in Cuba in October 1962:
The US had already surrounded the Soviet Union with 
its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that American 
missiles were aimed at us in Turkey and Italy, to say 
nothing of West Germany. As Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, I found myself in the position of having to 
decide on a course of action which would answer the American 
threat, but which would also avoid war.... In addition to
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protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the 
West likes to call 'the balance of power. (18)
As Richard Lowenthal pointed out at the time, the Cuban missile
venture provided a striking illustration of the choice between
conflict and collaboration that the erosion of alternatives appeared
to have forced upon Khrushchev. (19) The US detected the missiles
before they were installed and forced an 'ignominious' climb-down by
Khrushchev.
Crucial for the conduct of Soviet policy, the crisis confirmed 
publicly the Soviet comparative strategic inferiority. The two 
superpowers had been brought to the brink of disaster and were
consequently stimulated to explore ways of thawing the 'Cold War'. 
One tangible result of this crisis was the establishment of the Hot- 
Line link between Washington and Moscow. Moscow had resigned itself 
for the time being to reliance on a minimum deterrent considerably 
smaller than the US strategic might. Soviet interest in arms control 
measures governing testing reached a high point for the decade.
The Threat from Third Parties
Other strategic concerns reinforced the Soviet desire to achieve 
agreement on 'partial measures.' The first of these was an intrinsic 
Soviet fear of the rise of Germany following the bitterness of
conflict during World War II. Whilst the US expressed a fear of a
'nuclear Pearl Harbor,' it is the Soviet experience of invasion from 
the West which they wished to ensure would not be repeated.
Within the GCD plan, the USSR wished to see the establishment 
of an 'atomic-free' zone in central Europe. The need for a political 
settlement in Europe was reflected in the explicit desire to stop
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Germany from becoming a nuclear power. In addition, it would open up 
the way to the political gain of dividing NATO. Not only would the 
policies proposed neutralize germany's future military-political 
potential; they would also achieve another major objective of Soviet 
policy, the removal or at least retraction of the US military presence 
from along the perimeter of the USSR and its allies.
Another strategic consideration of significant and growing 
influence was the ideological rift with the Chinese. The People's Army 
of Mao's China also became a military threat to Soviet territory in 
Asia gained before the Bolshevik revolution. China requested that 
this territory be returned. The USSR refused. Coincidental with an 
ideological rift, the Chinese invaded across the Massala River in 1961 
and inflicted heavy casualties before being repelled. Since that 
time, approximately one million Soviet soldiers have been stationed on 
the Chinese border and part of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal has been 
targeted on China. The Chinese held to orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine which stated that Capitalism would not perish without war. 
Disarmament would harm the possibilities of supporting wars of
liberation. In 1960, Khrushchev attacked Mao for knowing little of 
the realities of the modern world or the dangers of thermonuclear war. 
(20)
Following the Cuban missile crisis, open enmity existed between 
Peking and Moscow. The Chinese accused the USSR of making a 'fetish'
of nuclear weapons. They did not share the view that nuclear weapons
qualitatively changed the nature of war.
With signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the verbal
conflict reached a new intensity. The Chinese charged that the pact
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was a result of a plot between the USSR and the imperialists to 
preserve a three-nation monopoly of nuclear weapons and to ‘contain* 
Communist China# In this there may have been some truth. The Soviet 
Union justified the pact as part of a step-by-step approach to 
disarmament: two important steps in the process were non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and the campaign to warn the people of the world of 
the extent of the * ruins* that a nuclear war would leave behind it. 
Whatever motive, the treaty placed obstacles in the path of the 
Chinese quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own.
Whilst the ideological and military conflict with China is 
consistent with an increased Soviet propensity to conclude agreement 
with the US in terms of chronology, its validity as an explanatory 
factor in its own right is severely limited by the fact that it cannot 
be tested until a significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement takes place. 
If this should happen, this hypothesis would hold that the USSR would 
become markedly less willing to negotiate and conclude agreements.
It is clear that the global military-strategic factor best 
accounts for both the stability and fluctuations in Soviet policy 
toward arms control during the Khrushchev era. Fixed elements among 
The Soviet Union's interests and policies on arms control were the 
profound and overriding concern to avoid general war with its 
catastrophic effects and, also, the USSR's acquisition of a credible 
minimum deterrent. The changing balance between Soviet and American 
strategic forces appears to have been the 'enabling* condition for 
agreement on arms control. The Cuban episode forced Khrushchev to 
accept that national security could not be enhanced through unilateral
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military action. The US and USSR shared a common interest in reaching 
agreement, perhaps more as a symbol of mutual responsibility for world 
peace than as a means to address specific questions of armaments. As 
L. Freedman points out, ’the prospect of an all engulfing nuclear war 
reminded the superpowers that they should not push their differences
over ideology and geopolitical interests too far .f (21)
1
This was at the core of the shift in Soviet strategic doctrine
and state ideology. Soviet entry into the nuclear era dictated a new
realism symbolized by the adoption of the policy of ’peaceful
coexistence* - a realism that cannot be explained solely by a broad
definition of military-strategic factors. One has to look for the
recognition by Soviet leaders that a profound qualitative change had
taken place in the nature of the strategic balance.
Peaceful Coexistence.
Khrushchev’s rival for leadership within the politburo, Malenkov,
was the first Soviet leader to acknowledge realization of the
consequences of open conflict with the West. In 1954, he stated that
war 'with the contemporary means of warfare means the destruction of
world civilization.’ (22) However, talk of the destruction of world
civilization was attacked by Molotov and others in the Politburo for
encouraging fatalism and defeatism. (23) The official position
evolved to the point where future war was viewed as a retardation
rather than a prevention of the inevitable march toward Communism.
Khrushchev later explained:
War would be a calamity for mankind and would take a heavy 
toll of human life and values. But man, nevertheless, would 
not perish. Since man would survive, the ideas of Marxism- 
Leninism are immortal. Humanity would rid itself of 
Capitalism but the price would be such that there should be 
no resort to War. Both the Socialist and Capitalist
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countries would suffer. So we shall just have to live side 
by side on one planet. (24)
This was the essence of ‘peaceful coexistence1 and became a 
clearly stated policy orientation in 1956, by which time Khrushchev 
had consolidated his position as undisputed leader.
At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in April 1956, Khrushchev 
radically altered the direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy 
by denouncing Stalin in a secret speech, and he elaborated on the 
policy of peaceful coexistence. Crucial to the adoption of this 
policy was a major reinterpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
Khrushchev stated that war was no longer 'fatalistically inevitable.' 
The USSR now had the capability to prevent Capitalism from 'unleashing 
war' but the Soviet leadership was aware that nuclear war would
result in mutual annihilation. This was a change in strategic
thinking, with 'peaceful coexistence* the only alternative to nuclear
war.
The nuclear revolution undermined orthodox Communist doctrine on
the link between war and revolution. Khrushchev's statements after
1956 reflected the awareness of the destructive nature of
thermonuclear war. He persistently argued that the cost of victory in
a showdown between nuclear superpowers would be such as to make the
use of the word 'victory' ludicrous.
Nuclear war would involve the destruction of cities, 
factories and plants on an unprecedented scale. It would 
mean the deaths of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of 
people. Its consequences would be gravely felt in the life 
of generations to come .... Now that science has come up 
with the means of destruction of unprecedented power, any new 
world war would involve untold calamities and suffering for 
humanity ..... Must the establishment of the new order on 
the ruins of the past be paid for in the blood of hundreds 
upon hundreds of millions of people? Is there no other way?
(25)
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B.G. Bechhoeffer argued that the ’Soviet realization of the
destructive potential of nuclear weapons influenced or even caused the
change of the Soviet emphasis on the inevitability of war.1(26)
This was the doctrinal shift which accounts for the ideological
Sino-Soviet split. In essence, Khrushchev sought to increase Soviet
security by avoiding nuclear war and setting up survival by avoiding
nuclear war as a prerequisite for all else. On the eve of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty, Chinese Politburo member Liu Shao-Ch’i stated:
In the eyes of modem revisionists, the main 
contradiction of our time is between Mankind and nuclear 
weapons, between life and death. All class and national 
contradictions must now be subordinated to this 
contradiction. To survive is everything. The philosophy 
of survival has replaced the revolutionary theories of 
Marxism-Leninism. (27)
Khrushchev’s reply was to attack the Chinese for being indifferent to
the fate of 'hundreds of millions of people who are doomed to death in
the event of a thermonuclear war' and the ensuing ’destruction of the
values of human civilization.' (28) A. Dallin saw this reply as a
'declaration of what critics of Marxism had argued for years:
technological change could override categories and could indeed arrest
historical laws hitherto deemed universal and ineluctable.' (29)
This was encapsulated in the CPSU’s 'open letter' of July 14th, 1963,
with the statement that 'the atomic bomb does not adhere to the class
principle.' (30)
Soviet policies followed this line and were upheld, explained and
defended by Khrushchev with reference to 'peaceful coexistence.'
Adherence to this political world view naturally tempered Soviet
attitudes and approaches to policies of disarmament and arms control
throughout the Khrushchev era as such policies are derivative of
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general policy orientations and aims. Bechhoeffer saw that the
practical importance of the change in Soviet ideological emphasis in
the direction of peaceful coexistence was that it resulted after a
short interval in precise proposals which permitted genuine
negotiation and translated into a specific program: (31)
Agreement between the two countries (US and USSR) 
and between all the great powers on the problem of 
disarmament would be welcomed with great satisfaction by 
ordinary peoples in all comers of the world and would open 
the door for broad cooperation between states and for a 
stable ’peaceful coexistence* of all countries and 
peoples. (32)
This first manifested itself in Soviet acceptance of the principle of 
'partial measures' toward disarmament and initiated a process to this 
end in 1957. However, by 1959 and as a result of the trends which 
apparently gave the USSR a strategic superiority due to advances in 
ICBM technology, the Soviet position returned to unrealistic and 
general programs for complete disarmament - a simple reiteration of 
slogans.
Accompanying such slogans were repeated acknowledgment of the 
destructive nature of the new weapons being incorporated into the 
superpower's arsenals. R.J. Barnet recognised in early 1961 that the 
Soviets were becoming more seriously concerned with the risks of the 
arms race. (33) An effort was made to reconcile the possibility of 
arms control with Marxist ideology. The Pravda editorial of June 
13th, 1960, attacked Party members for refusing to believe in the 
'possibility of disarmament' and discussing the Government's 
disarmament policy as a 'pacifist illusion.' Barnet continues: 'this 
discussion might suggest that Khrushchev is determined to develop 
within the USSR an ideological position that can encompass negotiated
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disarmament.1 One must bear in mind A.B. Ulam's point that Communist 
doctrine 'will be stretched to justify any practical needs of policy.1
In order to establish domestic popular support for arms control
measures, Khrushchev reiterated the theme of the mutual annihilation
of war in order to bring this message home to the Soviet people, and
to further underline the Soviet priority of avoiding nuclear war.
The monstrous destructive force of modem nuclear 
weapons and the possibility of delivering them to any point 
on the globe are such convincing arguments today that man's 
reason cannot fail to demand the earliest possible solution 
of the problem of disarmament. - Campaign Speech in 
Moscow, March 17th, 1962. (35)
Following the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, the superpowers
neared agreement on banning nuclear tests. Khrushchev felt the need
to reaffirm the justification for such treaties in the light of
intense doctrinal rivalry with the Chinese. This again was done in
reference to nuclear wars
As for Marxist-Leninists, they cannot propose to 
establish a Communist civilization on the ruins of the 
centers of world culture, on land laid waste and 
contaminated by nuclear fallout.... To use a familiar 
phrase, blessed is he who talks about war without knowing 
what he is talking about. (36)
The editorial in Kommunist in May 1961 stated:
Peaceful coexistence is one of the forms of the
class struggle in the international scene, a struggle that
is economic, political and ideological. (37)
Following the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership's reappraisal of
the world situation was based on the assessment of the consequences of
open conflict with Capitalism. It would mean a devastating nuclear
war; hence the above emphasis on forms of struggle other than
military. Nuclear weapons had qualitatively altered the nature of the
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strategic balance, but despite the ICBM achievements which put the 
USSR ahead of the US, technologically for a while, the military and 
economic balance remained firmly in America's favor. It is to 
economic factors that I shall now turn.
The Political Economy of the Arms Race*
As in previous chapters, economic considerations proved to be a 
contributory factor accounting for a positive Soviet predisposition to 
conclude agreements after which the USSR would be able to cut back 
military expenditures. This would enable the diversion of resources 
to meet domestic needs and create an international atmosphere which 
would promote bilateral trade. This was the view of Jules Moch, the 
French disarmament negotiator, when he stated in 1954 that the USSR 
required an immediate reduction in the armed forces in order to 
maintain its civilian production. (38)
Khrushchev announced that the ultimate stage of Communism would 
be achieved by 1980. This was at a time when growth in the Soviet 
economy provided grounds for such optimism. The Soviet economy is one 
of full employment where resource allocation is a centralized 
decision-making process. Increased military expenditure without 
productivity gains in the economy as a whole would necessitate 
resource allocation from a civilian sector of the economy. The 
building of a Communist society is interpreted domestically as a 
promise of rising standards of living. He stated this clearly in 
1960;
And as for the development of our peaceful economy, 
such a unilateral initiative in the field of disarmament 
will do us much good. It will save us 16 to 17 billion 
roubles annually. Besides, more than a million young, 
energetic, capable workers will go to work in the fields, 
factories, power plants, and construction projects. All
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this will of course be beneficial for a further rise in the 
living standards of the people. (39)
Khrushchev attempted to unilaterally cut force levels prior to 
1961, despite the severe reservations and open disquiet of military 
interests in the Kremlin. He saw that ICBMs reduced the need for
large conventional forces, but the cuts initiated in the four years 
prior to 1961, which Khrushchev asserted totalled 2,140,000 men, were 
reversed following the Berlin crisis of that year. (40)
The Test Ban Treaty coincided with increased allocations to 
'soft' sectors of the economy. In December 1963 the-commitment to a 
forced development of the fertilizer industry to aid agricultural 
production was indeed accompanied by a reduction of the military 
budget. (41)
Conversely, the US military build-up under Kennedy was seen by
Khrushchev to reveal a lack of commitment to reach arms control
agreements and also as an attempt to undermine the economic vitality
of the USSR. He stated ’They would like to sap our might and by so
doing restore the one time rule of monopoly capitalism.' (42) He
emphasised the international benefits of disarmaments:
Disarmament does not only benefit a single state or 
group of states, it opens the way to a lasting peace and 
economic development for all countries and for all peoples.
(43)
By 1963, Khrushchev's economic successes, such as the Virgin 
Lands Campaign, had been dramatically reversed, with the result that 
economic growth was at the lowest level in Soviet history. The 
economic crisis coincided with the Test Ban Treaty and although a ban 
on testing in itself would not release Soviet resources for other 
purposes, it was believed that disarmament measures would result from
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such an agreement. In a note from the Soviet to US Government, it was 
stated:
The Soviet Government agrees that the successful 
completion of the talks on the banning of nuclear tests 
would aid progress in other areas of disarmament. (44)
This explains arms control initiatives at this time - the Soviet
economy required them. The argument is strong, but not convincing.
Decisions of national policy priorities have been shown to be of
an overriding political nature. Agreement was not reached on
measures which would require multilateral reduction of military
expenditure. At this time, the USSR approached, with great caution,
solutions to the problems of the arms race, especially those which
would significantly limit future freedom of action, as any technical
breakthrough could destroy military balances.
Khrushchev himself admitted in 1960 and again in 1962 that
consumer welfare must take second place to defence needs. (45) Clearly
military interests did exert significant influence on policy
priorities within the decision-making (resource allocation) process.
Naturally, a continually spiralling arms race did exert a great strain
on the Soviet economy and therefore stimulated the leadership to
search for at least a limited detente. A. Dallin summarized Soviet
priorities:
One may therefore assume that Moscow fears - second 
only to war - an intensification of the arms race by the US, 
and that it has learned to refrain from certain provocative 
steps preci ’ so as to forestall such an American
Gonclusi.oti.
The most significant development in the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy during this period was the Kremlin’s pursuit of policies
response.
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designed to manage an international environment overshadowed by the 
dangers of nuclear war. In light of the continued enmity with the 
West, A. Dallin suggests that the origins of the detente which 
characterized superpower relations during much of the 1970s are to be 
found in the search for areas of common interest which began with the 
recognition of the catastrophic consequences of thermonuclear war. 
(47) Soviet policies designed to promote arms control were a 
dependent variable of inseparable military and political factors. 
Whilst the USSR sought to enhance national security in the face of 
continued (albeit interrupted) military, technological and economic 
superiority of the West, the changed nature of the strategic 
relationship necessitated a far reaching reappraisal of ideology and 
strategic doctrine. The result was the general policy of ’peaceful 
coexistence* which placed greater emphasis on negotiation with the 
West. Thus, the Soviet leadership was more positively disposed to 
seriously discuss disarmament issues in the many international foruns 
of the post-war world and enter into high-level negotiations on a 
bilateral level with US. Arms control agreements of a symbolic nature 
in terms of explosive power and proliferation rather than delivery 
vehicles were concluded at the end of the Khrushchev era, but treaties 
of real substance were almost a decade away when the enabling 
condition of a mutually acknowledged strategic balance could be seen 
to be at work.
CHAPTER 4
THE BREZHNEV YEARS: SALT AND DETENTE
It was during the 1970*s that the first arras limitation agreement 
was reached in the nuclear era. The Strategic Arras Limitation 
Treaties (SALT) constrained the central strategic weapons of the 
superpowers for the first time since the Washington Naval Treaty of 
1922 and symbolized the reciprocity of US and Soviet foreign polices 
in an atmosphere of detente. T.W. Wolfe regarded SALT and detente as 
having a symbiotic relationship, with SALT as *a pivotal aspect of 
great power relations between the US and Soviet Union, a medium 
through which some accommodation of both the disparate political 
interests and the perceived strategic necessities of the two sides has 
been sought.® (1)
For the Soviet Union, detente was built upon a strategic 
relationship of parity in delivery vehicles with the US. The SALT 
treaties were a recognition of that fact - an uncomfortable one for 
the US in light of the Soviet military build-up which had taken place 
to achieve parity. The Soviet Union also felt itself to be more 
secure due to the dissipation of tensions in Europe, and to their own 
efforts toward self-sufficiency and reliance on military power which 
coincided with an increasingly active and successful foreign policy, 
particularly in the Third World. The US was still extremely 
suspicious and distrustful of Soviet objectives and the USSR
exhibited the characteristics of being a reactive power to the 
behaviour of the US. Detente and arms limitation did little to alter
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the dynamics of the arms race.
Factors contributing to the USSR's greater willingness to 
conclude meaningful agreements during the 1970s were the persistent 
economic strains the arms race put upon the Soviet economy and the 
desire to reap the benefits of trade with the West. In addition, 
hostilities with China were still intense and became alarming with the 
prospect of Sino-American cooperation. China had become a regional 
super power of enormous significance in calculations of the global 
strategic balance. These were the incentives for the Soviet Union to 
make detente with the US work. The Soviet leadership actively pursued 
a serious and consistent policy toward concluding significant arms 
limitation treaties with the US as the focus and symbol of detente. 
The progress and successes of this policy are outlined below.
The precedent set by the signing of the 'Nuclear Test Ban Treaty' 
was followed by significant treaties between the US and USSR in the 
late 1960's and early 1970's, despite the removal of Khrushchev from 
power in October 1964. Four of these were 'non armament' treaties. 
The first was the Treaty on Principles Governing the activities of 
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, signed in January 1967. This prohibited 
the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in 
space, on the moon or in orbit and stated that the moon and other 
bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This was a 
shift in the Soviet position from 1962 which would not separate non 
armanent from other disarmament issues. (2)
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Hie second 'non armament' agreement was the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in July 1968, Underpinning 
this treaty was a realization that proliferation would increase the 
risk of war by accident or escalation. The Treaty on the Prohibition 
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 
was signed in February 1971. Following a shift in Soviet and US 
positions in April 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed.
As a result of working parties set up during the SALT 
negotiations, an Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak 
of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR and a "Hot Line' 
Modernization Agreement' were signed in September 1971.
After two and a half years of negotiation, the Interim Agreement 
on Strategic Offensive Arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM) which together formed SALT I were signed in Moscow on May 26th, 
1972. Hie ABM treaty regulated the type and number of missile defences 
each side could build, thereby leaving unchallenged the penetration 
capability of the other's retaliatory missile force. This enabled the 
two sides to effectively agree to freeze their strategic arsenals with 
verification by 'national technical means.' The major flaw of the 
agreement was the failure to limit the extent of putting multiple 
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVing), ie. targeted warheads, on 
missiles. Hiis was to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations.
The momentum of arms limitation was maintained after SALT 1 by 
agreement in June 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war between the US
59
and USSR. Holloway sees this as the 'high point* of the Soviet- 
American detente. (3) It committed both sides to remove the danger of 
nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons as an 'object of their 
policies.' (4) It was a bilateral agreement with multi-lateral 
implications which pledged the superpowers to pursue policies 
dedicated toward stability and peace. This was a highly symbolic 
agreement and the least restraining of the arms control treaties 
during this period.
Thereafter followed a series of agreements on a range of issues. 
The first of these was the Protocol of July 1974 which further 
restrained deployment of ABM Systems. It limited each side to one ABM
System and was to be reviewed every five years. Also in July 1974,
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed which limited the yield of 
test explosions. In August 1975, both sides agreed to ban weather 
modification, and in May 1976 there was agreement to govern under­
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
At a meeting between President Ford and General Secretary 
Brezhnev at Vladivostock in November 1974, an outline for SALT II was 
agreed upon which would replace the interim agreement with a 
comprehensive treaty imposing broad limits on strategic offensive
weapons systems. The number of nuclear warheads was not to be limited
but within the 2400 equal aggregate limits on IGBMs, submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers, the number of MIRVed 
systems was to be constrained. This was the basis of the SALT II 
treaty signed in June 1979 which remained unratified by the US Senate. 
SALT and Strategic Parity
President Johnson had proposed talks on strategic arms limitation
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in January 1964. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin met with President
Johnson in 1967, laying the groundwork for further progress in
negotiations, but due to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
September 1968 progress was stalled until after President Nixon’s
inauguration in January 1969 at which time the Soviet leadership
expressed willingness for discussions on this issue. (5) Payne
asserts that before 1968, strategic arms control was not on the Soviet
agenda. (6) Tensions with China, the ignominious climb-down over Cuba
in 1962 and the consequent Soviet realization that their strategic
relationship with the US was not one of parity provided a strong
impetus for a rapid military build-up during the 1960s. In his report
to the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966, Brezhnev stated:
Constant concern for the strengthening of the 
country’s defences and the power of our glorious armed 
forces is a highly important task of the Soviet State. The 
Party deems it necessary to ensure the further development 
of the defence industry, the perfection of nuclear rocket 
weaponry and all other types of equipment. The security of 
our homeland demands this. (7)
Soviet policy was to be built on a firm military basis which,
after 1968, was sufficiently strong to allow a shift toward arms
limitation.
By the early 1970s, the Soviet-American strategic relationship 
became clearly established as one of parity. (8) The USSR surpassed 
the US in the number of ICBMs in 1969 to be followed by total 
strategic delivery vehicles and total megatonnage in 1973 and SLBMs in 
1975. This offset the US advantage in bombers and total number of 
warheads, which remained throughout the period.(9) See table 1.
Following World War II, the USSR had incessantly sought the
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symbols and the substance of parity with the US. The military build­
up had provided the substance and the symbol was to be formal 
recognition of this in the SALT treaties. This is made clear in 
Brezhnev’s report to the 24th Congress in March 1971.
Disarmament is one of the most important international 
problems of our time...We are conducting negotiations with 
the USA on the limitation of strategic armaments. The 
favorable outcome of those talks would make it possible to 
avoid another round in the missile arms race and to free 
substantial resources for constructive purposes....However, we 
should like to emphasize that disarmament talks in general, 
and especially talks involving the discussion of highly 
delicate military and technological aspects, can be pro­
ductive only if the interests of the parties* security are
given equal consideration and no one seeks unilateral
advantages• (10)
W.Clemens (11), S.Payne (12) and D.Holloway (13) all share the
view that the attainment of strategic parity was the precondition for
negotiation and explains the shift of policy after 1968. This of
course assumes that the USSR did not want to pursue strategic
superiority over the US. As will be shown later, the resources needed
to achieve this were more desperately needed for the domestic economy.
Brezhnev*s view that the key to negotiation success was the
principle of equal security for both sides was shared by President
Nixon who, in February 1972, said:
The approaching strategic parity provided an opportunity 
to achieve an overall agreement that would yield no uni­
lateral advantage and could contribute to a more stable 
strategic environment. (14)
It is interesting to note that under Nixon, US strategic doctrine
stressed sufficiency rather than superiority.(15) SALT was an outward
and visible sign of strategic parity and a political success for the
USSR in that it implied recognition by the US of Soviet political
equality.(16)
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THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC BALANCE 
Table No. 1
ICBMs SLBMs Bombers
US USSR US USSR US USSR
1982 1052 1500 664 1100 348 140
1980 1054 1400 640 950 348 140
1978 1054 1400 656 810 348 140
1976 1054 1500 656 750* 390 140
1974 1054 1600 656 640 470 140
1972 1054 1500 656 450 520 140
1970 1054 1300* 656 240 520 140
1968 1054 850 656 40 650 155
1966 1054 250 592 30 750 155
1964 800 200 336 20 1280 155
Delivery Vehicles Warheads Megatons
1982 2032 2490 11000 8000 4100 7100
1980 2042 2490 10000 6000 4000 5700
1978 2058 2350 9800 5200 3800 5400
1976 2100 2390 9400 3200 3700 4500
1974 2180 2380* 8400 2400 3800 4200*
1972 2230 2090 5800 2100 4100 4000
1970 2230 1680 3900 1800 4300 3100
1968 2360 1045 4500 850 5100 2300
1966 2396 435 5000 550 5600 1200
1964 2416 375 6800 500 7500 1000
* Takeover points. Source: Ground Zero: Nuclear War.
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It is in the desire to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation 
and to enhance the crisis management capability of the superpowers 
that T.W. Wolfe sees the most compelling of all Soviet incentives to 
pursue arms limitation agreements. (17) Moreover, by stressing the 
importance of detente, both Wolfe (18) and Holloway (19) see the 
Soviet leadership as pursuing a complementary aim, that of slowing the 
arms race by restraining a new technological surge by the US which 
enjoyed the advantage of better missile accuracy and planned to build 
four new systems - cruise missiles, the MX missile, the B1 bomber and 
the Trident SLBM. These systems would qualitatively affect the 
strategic balance.
The China Card
Another Soviet incentive to initiate and pursue detente and the
SALT process was the persistent theme of the Soviet leadership that it
was necessary to keep China militarily and economically isolated.
(20) It was following the Sino-Soviet Split in 1959/60 that the Soviet
disposition to arms control became more positive, particularly toward
the banning of nuclear testing, which China was about to begin. Once
Khrushchev was removed in 1964, the Soviet leadership felt compelled
to placate the Soviet military for a time and test the chances of
rapprochement with Peking. (21) The Soviet build-up during the 1960s
was in conventional as well as nuclear arms for forces to be deployed
on the Chinese border. In 1969, tensions between the two countries
were sufficient for massive border clashes. The intensity of conflict
could be seen in the rhetoric of Pravda editorials.
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party need all 
these absurd inventions only to declare the CPSU and the 
Soviet Union * Enemy No. I,1 against whom they intend to 
* fight to the finish1 while hiding behind the slogan of
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struggle against ’modern revisionism.* (22)
With signs of improving relations between the US and China in 
1970, Holloway sees Soviet arms control policy as a means to forestall 
this development. (23) Therefore, the American position was highly 
significant for Soviet perceptions.
Soviet leaders failed to get agreement from the US on pursuit of 
a joint policy toward China. Fears of a Sino-American rapprochement 
grew following Nixon*s opening to China in 1971-72 and as the Chinese 
sought closer Western contact after the death of Mao in 1976. Soviet 
relations worsened with the Chinese attack on Soviet client Vietnam in 
1977. In 1978, China signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with 
Japan which included an anti-hegemony clause directed at the USSR. In 
June 1978, Brezhnev warned the US not to play the ’China Card* against 
the Soviet Union as this was a ’shortsighted and dangerous policy.* 
(24) It was no coincidence that following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, the US imposed trade sanctions on the USSR and 
gave China Most Favored Nation status. As will be seen, economics 
were as ever an integral part of the superpower relationship.
As in the previous chapter, intensification of the Sino-Soviet 
split coincided with successes in US-Soviet arms control negotiations. 
Similarly, however, the hypothesis that the two are causally linked 
cannot be proven until a significant Sino-soviet rapprochement takes 
place.
Whilst Clemens maintains that there is evidence to suggest that 
Soviet arms control policy can be justified primarily in terms of 
international security requirements, (25) other factors cannot be
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ignored. As in all previous chapters, the economics of the arms race 
is a dynamic explanatory factor contributing to Soviet willingness to 
conclude agreements.
Mature Socialism and the Arms Race
Soviet commentators stressed the economic burden of armaments in 
the 1970s as they had done throughout the history of the Soviet state. 
In December 1970, Central Committee member I.U.Vlasievich wrote:
* Because of the constant threat from the imperialist powers, the USSR 
has been forced to increase it’s military expenditure at the cost of 
satisfying other needs.' (26) The CIA estimated that between 1967 
and 1977, Soviet military spending accounted for 12% of GNP. The rate 
of increase in this spending was 15% in 1968, 6% in 1969 and 1.1% in
1970. (27) Soviet official figures for combined defence and science
budgets rose from 19.7bn Roubles in 1965 to 39.8bn in 1970 before 
easing back to 34.8bn in 1975. The Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute estimated that Soviet defence expenditure rose from 
30bn Roubles in 1965 to 42bn in 1970 before slowing to 45.4bn in 1975
and 48bn in 1979. (28) By 1971, domestic economic problems were
already severe for the USSR. As the Soviet press were beginning to 
recognize 'sober forces' in the West (26), the Soviet leadership 
were pushing for detente which would give the USSR greater access to 
Western technology and credit. In November 1971, Georgi Arbatov wrote 
in Economika:
The economic aspect of the arms race has also assumed 
great importance. The enormous expense is a very heavy 
burden for the peoples, making it difficult to solve many 
acute economic and social problems...One cannot regard the 
current low level of trade between the USSR and USA as 
normal. (30)
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Foreign technology would increase production without domestic 
political risk. It was therefore no coincidence that the SALT 
negotiations were accompanied by a trade agreement. In December
1971, Pravda claimed that $125 million worth of contracts had been 
signed with US firms. (31) However, despite the heavy economic 
burden of arms production, the Soviet leadership was willing to bear 
it if necessary. Detente rather than specific arms limitation 
alleviated this problem.
The USSR continued to build up nuclear strategic forces 
throughout the 1970s to limits prescribed by SALT I. This was 
undertaken to keep up with the extent of US MIRVing of missiles and 
required an annual rate of increase in the military budget of between 
4 to 5% according to CIA estimates. (32) This was equal to the 
overall rate of growth in the Soviet economy so that direct defence 
spending remained relatively stable at approximately 12% of GNP 
throughout the 1970s. (33) This ensured that the USSR maintained
military parity with the US - a prerequisite for pursuit of 
comprehensive arms limitation on the basis of equality. By 1979, 
Soviet military expenditure was equal to 125% of US expenditure in US 
terms with the result that the SALT process was viewed in the US as a 
constraint on her technological-economic 'mobilization potential.1 
(34)
Soviet mobilization had exacted a large cost. Bad harvests in
1972, 1975 and 1979 caused the gap between official and free market 
prices of food to rise from 77% in 1975 to 100% in 1978. (35) The 
gap between the 1976-80 Five Year Plan and its fulfilment also grew, 
requiring economic reforms in 1979 and serving to intensify Brezhnev's
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desire to divert resources to agriculture. (36) Arms control and 
detente aimed to satisfy the need for economic and technological 
transfusions from the West and to divert scarce domestic resources 
from the incessant demands of the arms race in order to increase 
domestic agricultural production. As a reflection of this, foreign 
trade was given greater weight in economic policy. (37) However, it 
appears on the available evidence that economics was more of a 
contributory rather than determining factor in the Soviet arras control 
position.
Additional Factors
Soviet domestic politics provided additional stimulus to pursue 
arms limitation objectives. As Brezhnev consolidated his power during 
the late 1960s, priority was placed on military production. Prior to 
the 1972 Summit, Shelest was removed as the head of the Ukrainian 
Party organization signifying that Conservative opposition* to the 
negotiations would not be tolerated. (36) This illustrates that 
Soviet policy had undergone a re-evaluation of priorities from 
emphasis on military production to arras control negotiations, 
undermining Kosygin *s claim in March of 1970: *From the moment of the
appearance of nuclear weapons, the policy of the USSR invariably has 
been directed at saving humanity from the threat of nuclear war.1 
(40) Former head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
W.C.Foster, believed this claim, saying in 1971 that it was the moral 
leadership required of a nuclear power that had made the USSR more 
realistic and friendly toward the US. (41) This is a fine example of 
the hypothesis that entry into the nuclear era has made the USSR more 
positively disposed to measures of arms limitation. However, this
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does not explain the changes and subtle adaptations in the Soviet 
position during this period.
Brezhnev had a considerable investment of his prestige in the 
continued improvement of Soviet-American relations and had urged that 
detente be made ’irreversible* in 1973. (42) Prior to 1975, there
had been some disagreement within the ruling circle as to the utility 
of this policy and the gains to be made from SALT. By 1976, 
Brezhnev's position was consolidated when Defence Minister Grechko 
died and was replaced by Marshal Ustinov who was more favorably 
disposed toward Brezhnev's policies. In October 1977, Brezhnev became 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Also in that year, Ogarkov, 
who had been part of the SALT delegation, was promoted to Marshal.
(43) Ihese changes ensured the survival of the peace policy and 
weakened resistance to economizing and increased efficiency in 
relation to the defence budget.
From 1969 to 1975, detente had brought positive results to the 
USSR, but the years 1975-79 were less fruitful. The 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war and the extent of military and other support each superpower gave 
to the opposing forces, the US to Isreal and the Soviet Union to the 
Arabs, refocussed attention on the continuity of conflicting policies 
designed to promote regional interests. In 1974, some Soviet 
spokesmen were beginning to warn of 'anti-detente circles' in the US.
(44) The Soviet Union abrogated its trade agreement with the US in 
1975 following linkage of this agreement to Jewish emigration from the 
USSR. Some Soviet interests disliked increased dependence on foreign 
goods and technology for long range planning as this introduced 
unpredictability into the plans and increased Soviet economic
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dependence on the West, In addition, US adoption of the fSchlesinger
Doctrine' in 1974 fortified military views in the Kremlin that the US
wished to regain nuclear superiority. (45) The US perceived the USSR
to be attempting to develop an ICBM force, in the introduction of the
heavy SS-18 missile, which threatened to give the USSR a comparable
advantage in strategic weaponary.
This illustrates how fragile the ground is upon which the
necessary conditions for conclusion of meaningful arms control
measures are formed - strategic military parity. The Soviet
leadership had shown itself to be highly reactive to US behavior and
changes in the perceived threats of the global situation. In April
1970, Brezhnev announced?
We have created strategic forces that are a reliable 
means of deterring any aggressor. We will respond to any 
attempts by anyone to gain military superiority over the 
USSR with the requisite increase in military might, thereby 
guaranteeing our defence. We cannot do otherwise. (46)
'Struggle and Accomodation'
Brezhnev did not make Khrushchev's mistake of alienating the 
ideological zealots of the CPSU by forecasting a date for the 
establishment of Communism in the USSR. Instead, he classified Soviet 
development as having reached a point of 'mature socialism.' However, 
he did continue Khrushchev's policy of advancing the international 
cause of socialism by means of 'peaceful coexistence.' Western 
observers have labelled Brezhnev's adaptation 'struggle and 
accommodation.1 (47)
In 1971, Brezhnev stated that while following a 'consistent 
policy of peace and friendship among peoples, the Soviet Union will in 
the future carry out a decisive struggle against imperialism.' (48)
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At the 25th Party Congress in 1976, he reiterated this theme by saying 
that detente did not in the slightest abolish, nor could it abolish or 
alter, the laws of the class struggle. (49) Since the 1950s, the 
USSR had pursued an active policy of support for so called ’wars of 
national liberation* against what the USSR ideological leadership 
called ’imperialist oppression* in the Third World. In this way, 
competition with capitalism could be extended around the World without 
risking the outbreak of nuclear war. This policy of power projection 
achieved notable successes in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977, 
leading President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Z Brzezinski, to 
reflect that SALT II lay ’buried in the sands of the Ogaden.* (50) 
It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which left President 
Carter no option he felt, but to give up on SALT II.
Goodusion
It became clear that the two sides held different perceptions on 
the meaning of detente during the course of the 1970s. A common 
interest in arras limitation was built upon the concept of detente. 
The political will of the US administration eroded toward the end of 
the decade, whereas the Soviet leadership believed detente and the 
arms control agreements which symbolized it to be good things in 
themselves for both sides. They consequently pursued detente and arms 
control policies consistently throughout the 1970s. The Soviet 
perception was that increased projection of military power into the 
Third World in support of national liberation struggles was not 
inconsistent with detente and did not alter their desire for arms 
control. Whereas, for the US, detente was contingent on and later 
became linked to Soviet behavior in the third world and regional
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conflicts. Detente did not stop competition between the superpowers 
in their global relationship of a zero-sum game. In two respects, the 
detente era was a failure for the Soviet Union. First, and in stark 
contrast to a major aim of detente, relations with China got worse, 
intensifying Soviet fear of encirclement. Second, detente ended with 
a new and more threatening round of the arms race. President Reagan 
was elected and expressed US determination not to repeat the mistakes 
of SALT.
And so the new Soviet leadership once again had to face up to the 
economic burden of maintaining a strategic relationship of military 
parity with the US without encompassing constraints on the arms race. 
Arms control continued to be at the center of a profound dilemma for 
Soviet policy, which has been conducted from a position of military 
parity but relative economic and technological backwardness.
CHAPTER 5: Fran SALT II to Gorbachev
This chapter brings the study up to the end of 1987 when the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in Washington. 
There have been four leaders during this period - Leonid Brezhnev 
(died November 1982), Yuri Andropov (died February 1984), Constantin 
Chernenko (died March, 1985), and Mikhail Gorbachev who is the first 
Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to be bom 
after the 1917 revolution. He has another first to his name as the 
Soviet signatory of the first nuclear Disarmament treaty since atomic 
weapons were first developed in 1945 - the INF agreement. This is the 
one major success of the period. On the negative side, the force 
limits set out in SALT II have been exceeded and the 1972 ABM treaty 
is in serious danger of being broken
An asymmetric strategic military balance will be explored as the 
crucial factor in enabling the USSR to conclude the INF treaty, engage 
in meaningful Strategic Arm Reduction Talks (START) and defend the ABM 
treaty from potentially destabilizing developments. It is in the 
field of domestic economic considerations that a real dynamic can be 
seen to be at work. The imperative for the USSR was to arrest falling 
growth rates in order to maintain a its position of rough military 
parity. Maintenance of this balance in the face of challenges from the 
US and China was to be done by diverting resources to the domestic 
economy. This was the Soviet Union*s self-interest in fostering a 
climate of * neo-detente* with the US. Arms control and disarmament 
talks were to be a central element in the drive to reach this 
objective. The gradual improvement in Sino-Sovient relations and
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any impact it may have on disarmament postures will also be 
examined. First, a brief review of negotiations and related 
developments from 1979 to the end of 1987 is in order.
Superpower relations deteriorated rapidly in late 1979 with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the NATO decision to deploy 
Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe to 
counter the threat of the MIRVed Soviet SS-20 missiles. In January 
1981, Ronald Reagan became U.S. President after a campaign in which he 
described the SALT II Treaty as * fatally flawed*, and promised a 
build-up of conventional and nuclear forces. (1) A leading member of 
his Cabinet, Edwin Meese, said in 1981 that arms control should be 
subject to 'benign neglect.* (2)
The Soviet negotiators shifted the emphasis at the Mutual 
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna and at the INF and 
START talks in Geneva to the prevention of the Pershing II and GLCM 
deployments. They could not accept Reagan's 'Zero Option' proposal of 
November 1981 which proposed the removal of all SS-20s from Europe and 
Asia in return for cancelling plans to station Pershing II and GLCMs. 
This was in fact the outline and basis of the INF treaty
In May 1982, Brezhnev proposed a freeze on strategic weapons. 
The US response at the START talks was to propose a projected cut in 
Soviet land-based missile capabilities, which the Soviet leadership 
considered out of the question. In June, the USSR proposed that both 
sides reduce the number of missiles and bombers of each side to 1800; 
warheads would be reduced from 7500 to 5000 each with no more than 
half those warheads atop land-based ICBMs* (3) The USSR's force
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structure was such that 75% of their warheads were atop ICBMs whilst 
the US figure was 25%. Consequently, this proposal implied a major 
restructuring of opposing nuclear forces and directly addressed US 
dissatisfaction with the SALT II Treaty in terms of the asymmetry of 
the strategic nuclear equation. However, more pressing negotiations 
were taking place in the INF talks.
These began in Geneva in November 1981 and were troubled from the 
start by the difficulty in agreeing on which weapons systems to weigh 
in the balance of INF forces. The US view was that the USSR held a 6:1 
advantage in medium range nuclear forces. In the Soviet Union’s view, 
a rough parity existed. Disagreement over the numbers centered on 
whether a total of 263 British and French missiles, SLBMs and bombers 
would be included as they were in the Soviet calculations, the rate of 
dismantling of Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s, the number of Soviet SS-N-5s 
SLBMs in European and the type of bombers to be included. (4) Also, 
what were Soviet requirements for the security of its border with 
China?
Brezhnev offered to stop deployment of SS-20s in European USSR 
and reduce unilaterally its forces in return for a moratorium on the 
deployment of INF forces. This was modified in March 1982 when 
Brezhnev said the USSR would halt INF force deployment before any 
agreement was reached, indicating serious interest to avert the 
deployment of Cruise and Pershing II. (5)
According to an informal agreement reached between chief 
negotiators Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinski in July 1982 during a 
celebrated ’walk in the woods,' the USSR and US would each limit 
deployment of missiles in Europe to 75 launchers each. The question
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of MIRVing was not addressed. This apparent breakthrough would have 
allowed the US to deploy GLCMS but not Pershing IIs, a potential 
first strike weapon with a flying time of 4-8 minutes to the western 
part of the USSR and therefore more threatening. In effect, this deal 
would have given the US superiority in terms of numbers of warheads as 
GLCMs carry four each and SS-20s carry three. This formula was
unacceptable to both Moscow and Washington. Andropov offered a new 
concession in December 1982 with an offer to hold the number of SS-20s 
deployed down to 162, equal to the number of British and French
nuclear forces. (6) Although this was the first time in arms control 
negotiations that a superpower had offered to scrap first-line modern 
weapons, little progress was made on the basis of this proposal.
Relations became more strained during 1983 as the date for 
deployment approached. Reagan labelled the USSR an 'evil empire' and 
a Soviet spokesman called him and his advisers 'nuclear maniacs.' (7)
Further deterioration followed in September with the shooting down of 
a Korean airliner which had strayed into Soviet airspace. By 
November, Andropov had decided that he could not do business with the
US administration. Soviet delegations suspended participation in all
the principal arms control negotiations - the first time since 1969 
that arms control was shut down across the board.
As the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs became imminent, 
Soviet attention shifted from Euromissiles to space weapons. In March 
1984, new leader Chernenko suggested a treaty to demilitarize space 
and a moratorium on anti-satellite testing. Reagan's Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) was viewed in Moscow as an invitation to 
enter into an expensive and threatening new arms race in space. In
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November, Foreign Minister Gromyko went to Washington to meet US 
Secretary of State Shultz and President Reagan. Together they 
announced that the USSR and US would begin new negotiations covering 
*the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons.* 
(8) In 1985, arms control talks returned to centre stage as the 
chosen vehicle to rebuild a constructive US-Soviet relationship.
In the Summer of 1985, new leader Gorbachev announced a 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. By November, sufficient 
groundwork had been done to enable Reagan and Gorbachev to meet in a 
Geneva summit. They declared common ground on the principle of a 50% 
reduction in nuclear weapons as well as on the idea of an interim INF 
agreement. They also signed agreements in which both sides pledged 
that nuclear war must never be fought and that neither side would seek 
to achieve military superiority. In January 1986, Gorbachev proposed 
complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, and less ambitiously, 
he proposed the elimination of all INF in Europe. In May, Reagan 
announced that the US would break the unratified - but adhered to - 
force limits of the SALT II Treaty. At the Conference on Confidence 
and Security-Building measures and Disarmament in Europe, the USSR 
agreed in September to measures to reduce the likelihood of surprise 
attack which included, significantly, a verification process of 3 on­
site inspections a year. This was the background to a quite 
extraordinary Summit held in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986.
According to figures used at the Summit, the number of strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles possessed by each side at that time were as 
follows; 2500 for the USSR carrying 11000 warheads and 1900 US 
vehicles carrying 13000 warheads. (9) (These figures did not
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incorporate the relative * throw-weight' of those warheads in which the 
USSR enjoyed an advantage). Gorbachev proposed new ceilings of 1600 
delivery vehicles carrying 6000 warheads for each side. He also 
accepted Reagan*s *Zero Option* plan for Europe, leaving 100 INF 
missiles each in Asia and Alaska. In exchange, he wanted the US to be 
bound to the ABM treaty for ten years, which would confine all SDI 
research to laboratories. In response, Reagan called for the USSR to 
eliminate all ICBMs in the same period. Raising the stakes, Gorbachev 
proposed the complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons within 
ten years, again linked to the ABM proviso. No deal.
It was a frustrating and disappointing end to the Summit but the 
establishment of crisis control centers was agreed and real progress 
was made regarding INF. Gorbachev later accepted the double zero 
principle not just for Europe but on a global basis, opening the way 
for full agreement.
Ihe INF treaty was signed in Washington on December 8th, 1987. 
It was an agreement to destroy over 1400 Soviet warheads already 
deployed or awaiting deployment in Europe and Asia and 400 US 
warheads, all with ranges of 300 to 3000 Kms. (10) In addition to 
verification by national technical means, this treaty set a precedent 
with an ’Inspection Protocol* which stipulated on-site inspection at 
120 Soviet and 25 US locations for a duration of 13 years. (11) Even 
with a clear improvement in US-Soviet relations after 1985, this 
treaty was a very significant achievement. Following rapid change in 
the Soviet leadership, it was a considerable success for Gorbachev - 
the product of political, military and economic imperatives.
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The Military Balance in the 1980s
On September 19th 1987, the editorial of The Economist stated its 
views of what makes successful superpower relations possible. These 
were:
not goodwill, good intentions or even good ideas; instead 
an objective balance of power and advantage between Russia 
and the West which makes reasonable deals attractive to 
both. The right kind of balance now exists for the world 
to enjoy a long period of calm in Russia-Araerican 
relations. (12)
The editorial went on to remind its readers that relaxation of 
tensions did not mean that goodwill had replaced fhard self-interest* 
as the driving force of the USSR. (13)
The succession crisis impacted foreign policy with regard to the 
military balance in Europe. It was in this area that a shift in the 
focus of the USSR's arms control and disarmament policy became 
apparent after 1984. Soviet efforts in the 1979-1984 period were 
directed toward averting NATO's deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs in 
Europe and to stalling a new arms race in space. The threat of a 
potentially destabilising arms race in space remained to confront 
Gorbachev after 1984, but, the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs 
was already a reality. This necessitated a different approach to the 
question of medium range forces as part of a broader strategic balance 
as well as the issue of linkage with the space race.
First, it is necessary to examine the background of the INF 
treaty with regard to medium range nuclear systems in Europe which 
dates back to the 'failings' of the SALT treaties, the evolution of 
nuclear strategies and the specific question of the SS-20.
The SALT process bestowed upon the USSR co-equal superpower
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status in terms of strategic forces. Hie treaties did not cover medium 
range nuclear systems, theater nuclear weapons and the balance of 
conventional forces. These were crucial factors for Europe.
For the USSR's leadership under Brezhnev, before, during and 
after the SALT negotiations, concern was directed toward US and NATO 
Forward Based Systems (FBS). (14) The nuclear capable F-lll fighter 
bomber was introduced into Europe by the US in 1971. By 1974, the US 
alone had 700 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons in Europe 
according to US Govemament sources. (15) In addition, 84 British and 
French SLBMs were directed at the USSR at this time with over 100 
ready to become operational, as well as British Vulcan bombers and 
French Mirage jets. (16) The USSR also had to confront the threat 
posed by China.
These forces were deployed as the mainstay of NATO (France aside) 
European defenses to offset the far superior conventional capabilities 
of the Warsaw Pact and as such, the US refused to include these FBS 
forces in the SALT equation. NATO's view was that strategic parity 
left Europe open now that the credibility of escalation was 
undermined. NATO's adoption of the doctrine of 'flexible response* in 
the mid-1970s to address this shortcoming placed a premiun on systems 
with quick reaction time in which the USSR was inferior. This was 
viewed in the Soviet Union as lowering the nuclear threshold and a 
strategy to fight a limited nuclear war with superior theater 
airpower. (17)
Soviet medium range nuclear forces in the 1970s were mainly 
comprised of aging SS-4s and SS-5s deployed in the 1950s and 60s, and 
TU-16 and TU-22 bombers deployed in 1955 and 1963 respectively. (18)
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New systems were developed in the 1960s and 70s to augment these 
systems, SS-14 and SS-15s were deployed in the mid-1960s but not in 
any great numbers. Around 170 variable range ICBMs, the SS-11, were 
deployed in the western USSR in the early 1970s but were soon replaced 
by SS-19s. (19) After 1974, the TU-22M ’Backfire* bomber replaced 225 
TU-16s and 22s but only 90 were operational by 1977. (20)
It was the replacement of SS-4s and 5s (single warheads) with the 
multiple warheaded and mobile SS-20s from 1976 onwards which prompted 
NATO to adopt the ’Dual Track* policy of December 1979. This called 
for the deployment of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe 
which were percieved as very threatening in the Soviet Union.
According to R. Garthoff, the decision to depoly SS-20s was 
'natural' for the USSR's leadership and was 'fully compatible with the 
SALT negotiations.' He cites four reasons for this view. First, the 
missiles were a response to the threat posed by the medium range 
forces of Britain, France, China, and US bomber forces in Europe and 
the Far East. Second, they were deployed as a modernization of SS-4s 
and 5s which took 8-24 hours to prepare to fire and were thus easy 
targets and little use in countering 'flexible response.' Third, SS-11 
and SSN-6 missiles could not be kept as these counted against the USSR 
in the SALT numbers. Finally, SS-14s and 15s had proved to be too 
unreliable. (21)
There was also an element of the SS-20 being a product of the 
dynamics of the inflexible Soviet procurement process, being deployed 
for the sake of incorporating the latest technology into the nuclear 
arsenal.
By December 1979, 81 were deployed in the western part of the
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Soviet Union. By November 1981, 243 were deployed. The total reached 
405 with 1,215 warheads by the time the INF treaty was signed. This 
was a major addition to Soviet forces even offsetting for the 
replacement of older missiles.
According to H. Gelman, the Soviet achievement in the first half 
of the 1970s of what he labels a 1 robust parity* in relation to the 
overall balance of forces was followed, in the second half, by a 
sustained effort to build a more decisive theater nuclear capability 
in Europe and Asia. (22) W. Hyland, a senior officer at the US State 
Department, summed up the view in Washington in 1979 that the SS-20 
was a ’precise instrument of intimidation* through which the USSR 
aimed *to make West European policy subject to a Soviet veto.* (23) 
The SS-20 was also seen in the US as an attempt to make NATO policy 
unworkable and gave the Soviet Union 'escalation dominance.' This was 
the rationale of the 'Dual Track' decision of 1979 which was intended 
to restore the military balance in Europe as Warsaw Pact conventional 
superiority with SS-20s was viewed as undermining the credibilty of 
'flexible response.' (24)
The view from Moscow was that SS-20s did not threaten the parity 
which existed in Europe. In October 1979, Brezhnev claimed that the 
number of Soviet medium range missiles has actually been reduced and 
the Soviet Union had fewer medium range bombers than NATO. Therefore, 
SS-20s did not upset the balance. (25) The decision to deploy GLCMs 
and Pershing IIs in Europe was thus seen as an attempt by the US to to 
move to a position of superiority. This view was reinforced with the 
espousal by new US President Reagan of the concept of limited nuclear 
war in Europe. The implication was that such a war would engulf the
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heart of the Soviet Union including Moscow but leave the US unscathed. 
This was, in Holloway*s view, a competition of strategies as well as 
arms. Each side believed the other to be attempting to make the 
other*s unworkable. (26)
Holloway also points out that defining parity in specific terms 
is not a technical, but a political problem, (27) The radically 
different estimates of the European nuclear balance in November 1981 - 
parity versus a 6:1 Soviet lead - is an ideal case in point.
Relations between the superpower deteriorated rapidly after 1979. 
On top of the succession crisis, the USSR was confronted with the 
adverse international reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and the 
shooting down of the Korean airliner, a potential revolution in Poland 
in 1981 and a break down in arms talks with the US. In contrast, 
President Reagan was enjoying a recovery in the status of his office. 
He had public support for large increases in expenditure for 
conventional and nuclear weapons programs that were openly advertized, 
at least initially, as intended to restore US military superiority. 
The new administration demonstrated willingness to use force by 
invading Grenada. US troops arrived in Beirut and the anti-Sandanista 
(Contra) rebels were wholeheartedly supported. Arms control 
priorities were subordinated to a military build-up. The navy would 
be expanded to 600 ships and Pershing IIs and GLCMs would be deployed 
in Europe. Force modernization was speeded up with the production of 
MX and midgetman ICBMs, Trident II/D5 SLBMs and new B1 and Stealth 
bombers were being developed. Both quantitively and qualitatively, US 
military capabilities were enhanced. On the Soviet side, two new 
ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, were deployed.
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In effect, the political will necessary to define an agreeable 
parity in medium range forces was lacking during the 1979-84 period. 
Brezhnev attempted to halt the 'Dual Track' deployments by appealing 
directly to Western European public opinion via the Der Speigel 
interview. He made concessions in Novemebr 1981 and offered to halt 
SS-20 deployments before any agreement in May 1982. The 'walk in the 
woods' potential deal of July 1982 was followed by Andropov's offer to 
hold the number of SS-20s equivalent to British and French forces.
However, the leadership made some major miscalculations in 
trying to achieve their goal. Gromyko was the USSR's Foreign Minister 
throughout this period. In Haslam's view, he remained steadfastly 
'Americocentric'and did not pay due attention to the realignment in 
Europe underway at this time. Western European Governments were able 
to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of a visible US nuclear 
presence on the continent in the face of huge public protests from 
Berlin to London. In essence, Western Europe Governments moboiized the 
US to the percieved Soviet threat to Europe. (28)
Despite the offer of concessions, deployments of SS-20s continued 
throughout this period as part of the modernization program with more 
bases built in 1984 than any other year. Presumably, these missiles 
would be used as bargaining chips once negotiations resumed. Ihey 
would also offset the threat posed by the new NATO systems. Has lam 
suggests that the Soviet leadersip assumed that the momentum of 
detente was irreversible but the 1984 Presidential election provided 
no impetus for the US to restart negotiations. (29) Not only was 
Reagan negatively disposed to arms control at this time, the US 
administration did not incorporate the concept of offsetting
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asymmetries into its assessment of the military balance before the end 
of 1983. (30)
The final mistake Soviet leaders in this period made in the 
attempt to avert NATO deployments via agreement, was to stick to the 
concept of linkage with regard to the SDI.
By the time Gorbachev came to power, the objective situation had 
changed. GLCMs and Pershing IIs were stationed in Europe and the 
build up on both sides had damaged detente with the (JS and relations 
with Western Europe. Gorbachev adopted policies better suited to 
these changes.
However, the 1972 ABM Treaty remained under threat as the US 
pressed ahead with the SDI project. For their part, the USSR has been 
charged by the US with breaking the treaty by establishing a large 
radar at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. For Gorbachev, this was a 
political and military danger which would undermine co-equal 
superpower status as he pointed out in his book Perestroika, published 
in 1987:
the United States is not ready to part with its hope of winning 
nuclear superiority and this time wants to get ahead of the 
Soviet Union by speeding up SDI research.•• .SDI means moving 
weapons to a new medium which would greatly destabilize the 
strategic situation. (31)
Underlying this threat were technological and economic factors. 
On top of the large reallocation of resources needed to match such an 
ambitious project, the USSR would need to catch up with US 
developments using kinetic weapons, lazer particle beams and hydrogen 
fluoride chemical lazers as well as the utilization of advanced 
computers. Gorbachev reviewed the past 15 years of Soviet economic 
development in Perestroika:
85
Compared with advanced nations the gap in the efficiency 
of production, scientific and technological development, 
the production of advanced technology and the use of 
advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our advantage.
(32)
This was the most dynamic factor accounting for a clear shift in
the USSR's arms con to 1 and disarmament stance with regard to Europe
under Gorbachev's leadership. In support of this view, Holloway
points out that Gorbachev's succession was not only a turning point in
Soviet political history, but coincided with a turning point in Soviet
economic history. (33) This point will be dealt with in greater depth
later. Gorbachev could not, however, make concessions that would be
detrimental to the security of the USSR. In January 1986, Gorbachev
stated that the material and intellectual potential of the USSR gave
them 'the possibility of developing any weapon if we are forced to do
so.' (34) By December 1987, the action-reaction dynamic of the arms
race was vividly demonstrated when he declared that in terms of SDI
research, the Soviet Union was doing all that the US was doing. (35)
Ihere was a continuity in policy in terms of linking negotiations
to SDI. As a trade off to constrain development of SDI, Gorbachev
became amenable to accepting substantial reductions in high value
forces as shown by his sweeping proposals in Reykjavik as well as
agreeing to an INF deal in principle. The broad agreement to cut
strategic forces by 50% would enable the superpowers to establish a
numerical balance but this would be linked to strict observance of
the 1972 ABM treaty as Gorbachev pointed out:
Since the Americans want to get rid of the ABM Treaty and 
pursue SDI - which is an instrument for ensuring domination - 
then there is a need for a package where everything is
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interconnected. (36)
SDI remained the chief obstacle to agreement.
This changed at the 27th Party Congess at end of 1986 when
Gorbachev announced:
We must not let the 'Star Wars* program be used as a stimulus 
to a further arms race and as an obstacle on the road to radical 
disarmament. It would seriously help to overcome this obstacle 
if we could make tangible progress concerning a decisive 
reduction in nuclear cababilities. Iherefore, the Soviet Union 
is prepared to take a step in this direction by resolving the 
question of mediixn range missiles in the European zone 
separately - unconnected with the problems of strategic and 
space based armaments. (37)
According to W. Hyland, Gorbachev recognized that the
* correlation of forces' was no longer favorable to the USSR and that
it was an opportune moment for him to establish an equilibrium
with the US. (38) Whilst trends may appear unfavorable, deals are
made on existing equilibrium. For the USSR, arms control was the
vehicle to secure equal status and a means to protect regional and
strategic gains against a technically superior rival. Consequently,
Gorbachev accepted Reagan's zero-option on INF forces which required
dismantling a disproportionate number of Soviet missiles. He conceded
that there existed *a certain asymmetry' in the military make-up of
Europe but stated that the USSR stood for:
eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but 
not through a build-up by those who lag behind but through 
a reduction by those who are ahead. (39)
As A.B. Sherr points out, it was only after Gorbachev assumed 
power that the Soviet leadership proved willing to accept losses and 
adopt a 'radically* different negotiating approach which better served 
underlying Soviet interests. (40) He gave up the SS-20 and made 
disproportionate cuts in medium range defences. In return, GLCMs and
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Pershing IIs were removed from Europe and pressure was exerted on
Britain and France to stem expansion of their forces. In doing so,
they acknowledged the right to independent arsenals, and provided some
momentum for the denuclearization of Europe.
Ihe real success was in improving the image of the Soviet Union
and relations with Western Europe. Problems were mounting in Eastern
Europe and the need for European help for the economy far outweighed
the military and political advantages of the missiles. (41) Longer
terra national interests were served by the INF treaty. It was a means
to an end. The agreement gave impetus to negotiations on space
weapons and was necessary to give the disarmament process a lease of
life before the 1988 US Presidential election.
The new disarmament regime was still based on the notion of
equal security and the maintenance of a balance between the forces of
the USSR and US. This was Gorbachev1 s view;
There is a rough equality and parity between the US and 
the USSR in terms of the power and potential of the strategic 
forces.... A bomber more or a bomber less means little in 
the context of the present strategic balance... .All the Soviet 
proposals envisage equality and a balance at all stages. We 
prepare our proposals thoroughly, proceeding from the idea that 
no country would agree to act to the detriment of its security. 
(42)
Has lam argues that Gorbachev had only broken with the policies of 
his predecessors in redefining security as a political problem, 
requiring a political rather than a military solution, as this was a 
far cheaper option. (43)
From to Perestroika and Crisis
The economic impetus for the USSR to forge better relations with 
the West in the 1980s will be seen to be exceptionally strong. As
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arms control is the most prominent element of a better relationship 
between the superpowers, assessing the extent to which domestic 
concerns drive foreign policy is central to understanding Soviet 
intentions to negotiate and conclude deals. Intense economic 
pressures proved to be a major driving force of Soviet self-interest 
in reaching agreement on the basis of secure coequal superpower 
status so that resources could be released for the non-military 
sectors of the economy.
There had been economic malaise in the USSR during the 1970s and
the clear trend for the 1980s of declining secular growth rates.
According to Chief Soviet economist and architect of Peres troika, Abel 
Agenbegyan, growth rates for the period 1980-85 were 3% in the labor 
market, 5% in the output of extractive industries, and 17% in capital 
investment. The indices for 1975-80 were 6%, 10% and 23%. For 1970- 
75, they were 6%, 26% and 44%. (44) This was a significant decline
and trends suggested further deceleration. In the years 1984 and
1985, growth in Soviet National Income was at its lowest level in the 
post war period - 2.4% and 3.1%. (45) The target for the 11th Five
Year Plan (1981-85) of the planned growth rate of investment was 12- 
15%. This sharply contrasts with the figure for the Tenth Plan which 
was 29%. (46) Gorbachev recalls that 'an unbiased and honest
approach led us to the only logical conclusion that the country was 
verging on crisis.' (47)
Holloway points out that for the first time in the post-Stalin 
period, Soviet leaders were unable to combine growth in military 
expenditure with steady improvements in the standard of living and a 
high rate of investment. (48) Just how far defence expenditure has
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been protected against the effects of this economic slowdown is not 
clear.
The dire economic situation Gorbachev inherited developed 
problems of its own. The depletion of existing mines, oil and 
gasfields was driving natural resource development even further north 
in Siberia, raising resource exploitation costs. In addition, the 
USSR lost around $7 billion of export revenue in 1986 due to the 
combination of falling world oil prices and a devalued US$, finishing 
the year with a deficit on balance of trade with the West of some $2
billion. (49) The CIA. has estimated that the Soviet economy grew in
real terms by a mere 0.5% in 1987. (50)
This is in stark contrast to the expenditure levels of the Reagan 
administration engaged in an extensive program of military force 
expansion. In 1981, US defence expenditure was $ 144 billion. By 
1986, it was projected to have reached $343 billion. US defence
spending rose in real terms by 30% between 1982 and 1984. (51)
This build-up was perceived in Moscow as a plan designed to do 
'economic damage1 to the USSR. It was, in Gorbachev's words, an 
immoral attempt by the US to 'bleed the USSR white economically' and 
to lure them with a new arms race against an American economy roughly 
twice the size of the USSR's.(52)
Perhaps more importantly, this challenge to the USSR involved the 
development of advanced technology such as microcircuitry, directed 
energy systems, and genetic engineering. In these areas, the USSR was 
distinctly backward and according to W. Odom, they could not be 
developed in the USSR without extensive access to Western economics 
and R. & D. communities. (53) He posits a direct relationship
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between arms control and trade control. The US did exert pressure on
European and Asian allies not to export capital and technology to the
USSR particularly during the first half of the 1980s. Relations
between West Germany and the US were strained over German input into
the Siberian Gas Pipeline project in 1983. (54) Jacobsen supports
the view of direct links between arms control and trade control,
stating that in the context of the Soviet economic slowdown:
sweeping arms control proposals and extensive concessions 
to past Western demands [made by Andropov] may well come to 
be seen as a last ditch effort and a last chance. (55)
The pressing need for improved Soviet economic performance was
required in light of two other factors. China*s modernization program
had been underway for some time and had produced greatly increased
growth rates. This had uncomfortable implications for the Soviet
leadership which will be analysed in greater depth below. Also, the
economic burden of financing the Third World excursions of the
Brezhnev era forced the new Soviet leaders to pessimistically reassess
the cost/benefit ratio of those commitments. Over 100,000 troops were
pinned down in a seemingly unending war in Afghanistan, a constant
supply of aid flowed to support Cuba’s flagging economy and interests
in Southern Africa, and $3m a day was being pumped into support for
the Vietnamese regime and its occupation of Kampuchea. (56)
Severe economic pressures to reduce or at least to halt the
increase in defence spending provides the precondition for willingness
to negotiate and conclude arms control deals as the main element of
better superpower relations. Bad relations would cost too much in
terms of money for military budgets and in attention diverted from
reform. For Gorbachev, a START deal involving overall cuts in weapons
91
systems and a halt, to modernization linked to a ban on at least
deployment of spare systems would relieve pressure on the economy, at
least for a while. He was faced with the prospect that he may have to
spend billions on a counter Star Wars program. However, it is a
different matter to suggest that economic and technological
inferiority pressurized the USSR into arras control deals as a direct
function of that inferiority. Gorbachev wrote:
Hopes to wring any advantages in technology or advanced 
equipment so as to gain superiority over our country are 
futile. To act on the assumption that the Soviet Union is 
in a 'hopeless position* and that it is necessary just to 
press it harder to squeeze out everything that the US wants 
is to err profoundly. (57)
[The West must] get rid of the delusion that the Soviet Union 
needs disarmament more than "the West and that just a little 
pressure could make us renounce the principle of equality.
We will never do that. (58)
As in previous eras, the USSR would make the necessary sacrifices and
respond to this challenge if forced to do so rather than make
concessions which jeopardize its security. Considering Reagan's SDI
aim of establishing an effective defence from nuclear attack and to
make nuclear weapons 'obsolete,' Gorbachev asserted that a Soviet
response would not be too costly:
But we, the Soviet leadership, know that there is nothing 
which the US could achieve that our scientists and engineers 
could not. A tenth of the US investments would be enough to 
create a counter-system to frustrate SDI. (59)
Many top US scientists opposed to SDI have made a similar point.
Clearly, better relations would be preferable economically and
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politically. The USSR has embarked upon revolutionary economic 
reforms under the banner of ‘Perestroika* (Restructuring). Following 
on from the initiatives of Andropov, the first batch of measures was 
punitive. It included an anti-alcohol crackdown, a discipline 
campaign, a law against corruption and the black economy and the 
replacement of ineffectual and ’corrupt* officials. Andropov had 
fired over twenty Ministers and Deputy Ministers along with 20-30% of 
Party and Government officials at the local level. (60)
The second batch of measures, dating from 1985, proposed to 
profoundly transform the economy. Planning and production in the 
economy would be done in accordance with ‘cost-accounting* methods 
rather than the * gross-output* approach. This would mean that 
individual productive units would become self-financing and exposed to 
market forces. Private enterprise was permitted in an atmosphere of 
*Glasnost* (Openness), democratization and *de-Brezhnevization.* The 
government also announced proposals to establish Joint Ventures with 
foreign firms which would hopefully import much needed capital, 
technology and expertise.
Increased trade with the West is undoubtedly a major factor 
underlying the Soviet desire for better relations, but it cannot be 
said that other factors are subordinated to this aim. Gorbachev points 
this out:
Economic contacts provide the material basis for political 
rapprochement....not only economic factors prompt us to 
cooperate. Political goals are more important here than 
economic ones. (61)
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The China Factor
Incorporation of the new variables of Sino-Soviet and Sino- 
American relations into the superpower strategic equation provides us 
with a triangular framework of analysis which is far from equilateral. 
The Sino-American relationship was on a more positive footing than 
the Sino-Soviet. Relative shifts in these positions during the 1980s 
were, to a certain extent, reflected in the arms control posture of 
the USSR.
The early 1980s were particularly bad years for Sino-Soviet 
relations. The political problems caused by Soviet encirclement of 
China were substantial. Soviet expansion into Afghanistan, continued 
support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the deployment of 
SS-20s in Asia, and the growth of the Soviet military presence alone 
the 7000 miles of the Sino-Soviet border, from 45 divisions in 1973 to 
53 divisions in 1985, all served to reinforce the natural enmity of 
the two powers. Soviet unease with China's close economic and 
political ties with the US was compounded by the sporadic but 
nonetheless spectacular success of Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping's 
modernization program. The USSR also experienced strained relations 
with Japan and the ASEAN countries at this time.
From 1982, the triangular dynamic assumed a new quality resulting 
from a gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and a shift in the 
basis of Sino-American relations. Chinese foreign policy changed from 
orientation towards the US as an ally against Soviet expansion to a 
more balanced stance characterized in Beijing as 'independent. (62) 
Whilst regular military contacts with the US were maintained, at no 
time did the Chinese express willingness to enter into a formal
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alliance with the US. Emphasizing their non-aligned status, the 
Chinese leadership felt free to criticize the policies and actions of 
others they considered contrary to their values and interests. Deng 
announced that China was ‘against whoever goes in for development of 
outer space weapons.' (63)
Sino-Soviet relations gradually improved. In March 1982, 
Brezhnev expressed his desire for normalization of relations between 
the USSR and China and a willingness to establish talks. (64) In 
1983, Andropov and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua met for the 
first top level Sino-Soviet talks since 1969. Chinese President Li 
Xianian stated his desire for improved relations at Andropov's 
funeral. Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers met at the UN in 
September 1984 and in December, Soviet Vice Premier Ivan Arkhipov 
visited Peking to sign an agreement establishing a five year trade 
accord.
A day after Chernenko's death in March 1985, Gorbachev declared 
that he wished to see a serious improvement in relations with China 
and considered that, given reciprocity, this was fully possible. 
Peking took note of this 'positive attitude.' (65)
In July, another five year bilateral trade agreement was signed 
which aimed to double trade by 1990. This would establish a 
connection between each system's planning cycles. Trade has increased 
gradually from 1982 when borders were opened so that by 1985, it was 
worth $1.9 billion - a 60% increase on 1984. (66) However, Sino-
American trade was worth $6.1 billion in 1984 and $8 billion in 1985. 
(67) Greater still was China's trade with the economic colossus of 
Asia, Japan. Sino-Soviet trade remained a small portion of China's
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overall trade which totalled $59 billion in 1985, a 19% increase over 
1984. (68)
Modest trade links between the USSR and China did little to 
resolve outstanding political issues of disagreement. Prospects for 
the resolution of these greatly improved in 1987 with the INF 
agreement. All SS-20s deployed in Asia and targeted on China would be 
removed and destroyed. It also became clear that the USSR intended to 
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan - the first time that the Soviet 
Government has voluntarily conceded territory and a definite reversal 
of the Brezhnev doctrine. The last remaining obstacle to 
normalization of relations would be removed if the USSR exerted its 
influence over Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. Deng Xiaoping 
unconditionally offered to meet Gorbachev in a summit if this 
happened. (69)
Sino-Soviet rapprochement was still a long way off but these 
events signalled a clear political trend to this end. This undermines 
the thesis that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations will make the 
USSR less willing to negotiate and conclude arms control agreements. 
Entering 1988, the two policies appeared compatible, especially in 
relation to 'Perestroika*. However, W. Mills points out that should 
the difference between economic growth rates averaging 7.5% over the 
past ten years for the Chinese and 1.8% for the Soviets from 1976 to 
1984 continue, the balance of relative capabilities will shift 
significantly in China's favor in the long-run. (70)
Other Factors
Consistent with the public statements of previous Soviet leaders, 
Gorbachev supports the view that the effects of a nuclear war would be
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catastrophic and one should not be fought, as there could only be 
losers:
If the huge stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and other weapons 
that have been accumulated are unleashed, nothing will remain 
of the world. What we are talking about is the survival of 
humanity. (71)
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in April 1986, also
raised the spectre of the nuclear consequence of a conventional 
conflict in Europe. Gorbachev said of the accident that it 
’mercilessly reminded us what all of us would suffer if a nuclear 
thunderstorm was unleashed. * (72)
He has regularly renounced the first use of nuclear weapons and at the 
Geneva Summit, both sides pledged that a nuclear war must never be 
fought.
For Gorbachev, the sufficiency of just a few weapons to incur
unacceptable damage was justification in itself for substantial
reductions in force levels. This followed on from the logic that
detente had been based on the realization that a nuclear war could not 
be won:
The Soviet Union and United States now have the capacity to 
destroy each other many times over. It would seem logical, 
in the face of a strategic stalemate, to halt the arms race 
and get down to disarmament. (73)
Fear of nuclear catastrophe is, amongst others, a valid reason 
why arms control and disarmament deals are done. However, this fear 
has been seen to be a major component of Soviet leaders* thinking on 
arms control and disarmament issues from the beginning of the nuclear 
era. As there is only one data point to assess the impact of this 
factor in accounting for the Soviet leadership*s disposition to 
engage in negotiations and sign agreements, it does little to
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explain why the negotiation process can result in agreement at certain 
times and not others.
Another consistent theme in the policy statements of Soviet 
leaders has been the call for general and complete nuclear 
disarmament. This has been widely perceived in the West as a 
propaganda tool. However, in Reykjavik it appears that Reagan and 
Gorbachev agreed to complete disarmament, at least in principle. As a 
means of influencing public opinion in support of specific issues, it 
is a tried and tested stance. What was different about Gorbachev's 
call for complete disarmament by 2000 in January 1986 was that it 
included substantial verification measures. Soviet negotiators 
accepted rigid verification at the Conference on Confidence and 
Security-Building Measures just before Reykjavik. A.B. Sherr points 
out that at the summit, for the first time, a US President legitimized 
the Soviet offer by taking it seriously. (74)
During this period, the call for disarmament was also used as an 
additional lever to constrain SDI development. Gorbachev was not slow 
to point out that broad disarmament could be achieved if not for US 
intransigence over Star Wars.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership launched several public 
relations initiatives as part of a political campaign to prevent the 
deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs. They called for the 
establishment of nuclear free zones in Scandinavia and the 
Mediterranean. Colorful rhetoric likened Ronald Reagan to Hitler 
leading the world toward nuclear war. This rhetoric was partly 
intended to scare Western publics into pressurizing their governments
to mflkg concessions and to drive a wedge between Western Europe andc:
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the US. (75) Such language also served to justify Soviet defence 
expenditures to their own people.
Conclusion
This period can be neatly divided into two distinct parts, 1979- 
84 and 1984-87 with the INF Treaty the tangible achievement of a shift 
in focus of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy under the 
leadership of Gorbachev. He managed to forge a poltical will to define 
the nuclear balance in Europe after a potentially destabilising build 
up in weapons systems not covered by the SALT negotiations. National 
self-interest was the motivating force as a new and potentially more 
destabilising race in space armaments was getting underway. Trends 
suggested that the gap between the Soviet Union's coequal military 
superpower status and their inferior economic power would widen. Even 
China was getting its act together. Throughout its history, the USSR 
has been trying to catch up, so the basic policy response to the 
events of the 1980s had familiar features. The USSR locked into a 
military balance as the main element of better relations so that 
resources can be diverted to non-military economic sectors. 
'Perestroika' would benefit from it. Improved relations with Western 
Europe gained prominence as an explanatory varible in this context. 
Arms control and disarmament treaties are the locking devices, but can 
bind only where clear balance of force and interest exists. The US and 
NATO perception of the military balance in Europe was one of Soviet 
superiority below the strategic parity cemented by the SALT Treaties 
through superior conventional forces and the build up of SS-20s which 
gave the USSR 'escalation dominance.' The Soviet perception was one 
of parity threatened by new NATO systems, a strategy which lowered the
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nuclear threshold, US qualitative and technological superiority and
SDI which challenged the notion of mutually assured destruction.
No success was achieved at START during this period but the INF Treaty
was a unique example of the locking mechanism, and happens to be the
first instance of nuclear disarmament. With strict verification,
there can be no clearer balance than if both sides have nothing.
Gorbachev summarized his view this way:
When we submit our proposals at the negotiations, we 
proceed from the idea that if we take into account only 
the interests of the Soviet Union and ignore the partner's 
interests, no agreement will be reached. We call on the 
American side to do the same - treat us in the same way 
because we will never tolerate the superiority of the other 
side or any infringements on our security. And we do not 
want to prejudice the USA's security. If both sides display 
such an approach, the most resolute headway in all fields of 
Soviet-America cooperation will be possible. (76)
CONCLUSION
Russian and Soviet attitudes toward arms limitation and 
disarmament have fluctuated a great deal during the period under 
study. This paper has attempted to classify these fluctuations 
according to an analytical framework which separates these attitudes 
into four categories according to established propensities to refrain 
from negotiations, negotiate without serious intent to conclude 
agreements, negotiate with serious intent to conclude agreements, and 
finally, to conclude agreement with parties perceived as threatening. 
This has been undertaken chronologically from 1899 to 1988 with 
reference to six explanatory factors. Emphasis has been placed on 
necessary versus sufficient conditions with the aim of establishing a 
suggestive methodology for the analysis of Russian/Soviet arms 
limitation and disarmament policy formation.
In the course of this century, distinct periods conforming to the 
four classifications of negotiation propensities can be identified. 
Prior to World War I, the Tsarist Russian Government was not only 
favorably disposed to arms limitation but took a leading role in 
convening the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. World War I and 
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution did not significantly alter the conduct 
and objectives of Soviet peace and disarmament policy although there 
was little expectation that meaningful agreements could be reached 
with the Capitalist powers, some of whom lent direct support to forces 
opposing the Red Army in the civil war following WWI.
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From 1934 to 1945, the international situation left little scope 
for arras control negotiation of any sort. From 1945 to 1955, the 
Soviet Union engaged in extensive negotiations at the United Nations 
without serious intent to reach agreement. This began to change in 
1955 with a shift to meaningful negotiation with intent to reach 
agreement leading up to the signing of the 1963 Non-proliferation 
Treaty. The process was interrupted in 1957 when the USSR appeared to 
hold a lead in ICBM technology. This emphasized the distinction 
between the relative capabilities of explosive power and the ability 
to deliver those explosives on entry into the nuclear era - the NPT 
was based on a parity of explosive power. Agreement on delivery 
vehicles had to wait until the 1970s.
From 1963 to 1969, the Soviet Union negotiated several non­
armament treaties with the United States. From 1969 to 1979, the USSR 
pursued meaningful arms limitation negotiations and concluded the SALT 
I and SALT II Treaties - based on a rough parity of delivery vehicles 
and a host of other agreements with the US. This process was 
interrupted in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO 
plans to deploy a new generation of weapons systems in Europe and the 
election of US President Reagan. From 1982 to 1984, a succession 
crisis in the Soviet union overshadowed a return to a more positive 
attitude to negotiation for the Soviet leadership. From 1985 to the 
end of 1987, a positive disposition to engage in meaningful 
negotiation resulted in the first disarmament agreement of the nuclear 
era, the INF Treaty.
102
In many ways, the SALT and INF Treaties were a culmination of a 
general Soviet tendency to view arms limitation as ultimately 
desirable. This underlies the first necessary enabling condition for 
the serious conduct of arms control negotiations with the aim of 
concluding agreements - political will - and is reflected in the 
positive over negative disposition to negotiate throughout the period 
under study. The second necessary enabling condition - the one argued 
in this study to be the single best factor explaining both why and 
when arms limitation was viewed as desirable and achievable by the 
Soviet leadership - is the parity of relative military capabilities 
with states perceived as threatening to the Soviet Union.
The Russian and Soviet historical experience has led an insecure 
leadership to place military strength as the highest priority for 
security of national interests. Prior to World War I, military and 
economic weakness exacerbated by technological inferiority prompted 
the Tsar to pursue arms limitation agreements in order to avert the 
prospect of conflict. From 1917 to 1934, the same weakness led the 
Bolshevik Government to pursue similar objectives in order to provide 
a breathing space for reconstruction, and to split the Capitalist 
camp. In response to the threat from Nazi Germany and Japan during the 
later 1930s, Stalin rejected negotiation and relied on the collective 
security of the League of Nations and non-aggression pacts to keep the 
USSR from military confrontation.
The nuclear monopoly of the US following the end of World War II 
precluded any agreement on nuclear arms control until the USSR has 
developed similar capabilities. By the mid 1950s, the Soviet Union 
had acquired an arsenal of nuclear explosive devices - the first area
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where the two parties achieved a parity of capabilities. This 
coincided with a more serious tone in Soviet disarmament proposals 
which eventually led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 
1963. The next area of parity of capabilities was in delivery 
vehicles, which was apparent at the end of the 1960s and provided the 
basis for the SALT Treaties of the 1970s. Equality and equal security 
were seen as prerequisitesfor agreement by the Soviet leadership. 
Consequently, the SALT Treaties were hailed as great successes in the 
USSR.
From the observable data, one can conclude that military 
inferiority will dispose the USSR to negotiate arms limitations whilst 
building up her military strength. Parity of military capabilities 
will induce her to seek meaningful arms limitation agreements and 
provide the basis for those agreements.
On the brief occasion when the USSR held an apparent 
technological advantage over her chief adversary, the late 1950s lead 
in ICBM technology, it coincided with a decline in Soviet interest in 
agreement. This is where the influence of the perception of trends on 
the political will to conduct negotiations with seriousness of intent 
can be seen. Projection of trends had a direct impact on the Soviet 
negotiating position as the US remained superior in delivery vehicle 
capabilities (nuclear armed bombers within range of the USSR) 
throughout this period, and was reaffirmed by the Cuban missile 
crisis. This prompted the superpowers to recognize equal 
responsibility for management of their strategic relationship and 
resulted in subsequent ’Hot Line* agreements.
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Regional parity of capabilities has proved to be far more 
difficult to quantify. The INF Treaty required the USSR to destroy a 
disproportionate number of missiles in exchange for a clear ’Double 
Zero* parity in Europe and the withdrawal of threatening first strike 
weapons, Cruise and Pershing IIs - an agreement to cancel out 
quantitative and qualitative advantages. The Soviet aim was also to 
foster an international environment in which the economic burdens of 
engaging in another round of the arms race could be averted and Soviet 
resources directed toward more pressing domestic needs.
The USSR has shown itself to be less technologically innovative 
than other world powers and has consequently been more reactive to 
change. It was in order to address the advances in artillery 
technology by Germany before 1914 that the Tsar called for a peace 
conference in 1898, knowing that if war broke out, Russia would be at 
a severe disadvantage. In terms of the US nuclear monopoly following 
WWII, an arms control agreement would have constrained Soviet efforts 
to acquire a similar capability. The missile advances in the 1960s, 
ABN and MXRVing technology prior to SALT and SDI technology in the 
1980s were strong incentives for the USSR to negotiate arms control 
agreements as without them, the Soviet leadership could expect to lose 
their much sought after parity.
Soviet pronouncements have persistently stressed the economic 
benefits to be gained from disarmament. The chief reason for the 
Tsar’s wish to prevent the outbreak of war was a realization that his 
regime could not withstand the economic and social burdens of war. 
Peace negotiations after 1917 gave the new regime time to embark on 
its New Economic Policy (NEP). Economic problems with the failings of
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the ’Virgin Lands* campaign at the end of the 1950s stimulated 
Khrushchev to seek accommodation with the US. Arms control was seen as 
a way to permit reallocation of resources to agriculture. Again in 
the late 1960s, economic deceleration provided additional stimulation 
for Brezhnev to pursue detente in order to give the Soviet economy 
transfusions of foreign technology and capital. The background to the 
INF and START talks was Gorbachev’s assessment of the Soviet economy 
being close to crisis and the adoption of sweeping measures under the 
banner of ’Perestroika* to induce improvements in both consumer and 
agricultural production, also with the aid of foreign capital and 
technology.
Three events indicate that despite the prominence of economic 
imperatives, the Soviet leadership did hot view this factor as an 
overriding determinant of their foreign policy. In 1922, the USSR 
proposed to her neighbors a 25% reduction of force levels. The 
neighbors did not agree and yet by February 1923, the Red Army had 
been unilaterally cut by 25%. In 1960, the USSR unilaterally cut 
force levels again and in 1963 reduced its military budget without 
soliciting similar responses from the US. Other than these examples, 
the USSR has shown itself willing to bear the burden of an arms race 
if militarily inferior. It is one area where the USSR is in free 
competition with the West.
One factor consistent with Soviet disposition to conclude 
agreements with the US is the threat posed to the USSR by China. It 
was following the the Sino-Soviet split of 1959/60 that the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty was signed. The Chinese perceived this to be 
directly aimed at prohibiting their acquisition of a nuclear
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capability. In 1969, massive border clashes took place and it was 
immediately following these that the USSR began the SALT negotiations 
with the US. The prospect of a Sino-American rapprochement during the 
1970s was contrary to the Soviet objective of keeping China militarily 
and economically isolated and provided an additional stimulus for 
talks. The thesis that the state of relations with China are 
indicative of Soviet willingness to conclude agreements can only be 
really tested if a genuine rapprochement between China and the USSR 
takes place. The thesis posits that this event would incline the 
Soviets away from arms limitation.
Soviet domestic political considerations is another explanatory 
factor, albeit a minor one. During the post-Stalin and post-Krushchev 
succession crises, Khrushchev and Brezhnev aligned themselves with 
military interests as a means to further their power positions. Once 
in control, they supported a serious arms control effort leading to 
the NPT of 1963 and the SALT Treaties of the 1970s. To a certain 
extent, both invested their prestige in the success of negotiations 
with the West.
Propaganda has always been a part of Soviet disarmament proposals 
since the first General and Complete Disarmament plan of 1927. This 
aspect of Soviet policy can most clearly be seen during those times 
when the USSR does not pursue negotiations with full vigor. 
Overarabitious proposals buy time. They show the Soviets to be 
’Champions of Peace. * They cast capitalist powers as disinterested in 
agreement. They have attempted to reduce US willingness to use 
nuclear weapons, especially in the immediate post-WWII period. They 
have also been attempts to divide the West/NATO.
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The thesis that the advent of the nuclear era provoked a more 
serious attitude to arms limitation is weakened by the fact that there 
is and can only be one data point - the start of the nuclear era. 
This did coincide with a shift to a more serious Soviet position. 
After Stalin*s death, the Soviets stressed the devastating effects of 
nuclear war, they sought to reduce the risk of its outbreak and 
enhanced crisis management through agreement with the US, The Cuban 
missile crisis was a sobering experience and the,momentum of arms 
control has generally increased ever since. Arms control has become a 
major arena for the management of the superpower's strategic 
relationship. However, nuclear weapons have also provided the USSR 
with its clearest symbol of superpower status with all the political 
benefits that accompany it.
These are the sufficient conditions for the Russian/Soviet 
leadership to have a positive disposition toward arms control and 
disarmament negotiations and together form the basis of a political 
will to conclude agreements. This study has shown that the necessary 
condition for the conclusion of arms control negotiations with 
meaningful agreements has been the parity of relative military 
capabilities with states perceived as threatening to the Soviet Union. 
Whilst depending on military assurances of security above all things, 
to paraphrase W.C Clemens, 'the historical record indicates that the 
long term trends of Soviet external behavior (and domestic economic 
and political concerns) have been compatible with measures to contain 
the arms race.'
(W.C. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. xxii.)
**Notes to Pages 2 to 8*'
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(London: St. Martin*s Press, 1981): 85.
Stanley Bloomfield, W.C. Clemens Jnr and William E. 
Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1966): 1.
Alexander Dallin et al, The Soviet Union and Disarmament 
(New York: Praeger, 1964): 200.
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin Strategy and 
Arms Control (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1%1): 2.
Joseph Kruzel, "From Rush-Bagot to SALT: The lessons of 
Arms Control,” Orbis Vol. 30 (Spring 1986, No. 1): 202.
109
Notes to Pages 9 to 19
CUTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. Alexander W. Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensives,'* 
International Conciliation.490 (April 1953):177.
2. Trevor N. Dupuy and G.M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of 
Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Bowker,1973),p.52.
3. Ibid., p.49.
4. Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensives," p.177.
5. Ibid., p.179.
6. Ibid., p.180.
7. Max Kampelman,US Ambassador to the Madrid negotiations of 
the European Commission on Security & Cooperation in 1983 
and head of the American delegation to talks with the USSR 
on nuclear weapons which began in the Autumn of 1985 said the 
following in light of his experiences with the Soviet 
negotiators:
'I had not expected to find the degree of committment to 
Leninism that I actually did find in the heads of the Soviet 
delegation. These are people who have come up the hard way 
in their system. They have all been schooled in this hard 
way - and you do not survive this schooling unless you are 
able to survive the toughness of the system. They are well 
trained. The training is vigorous. At the outset, it is 
very much a theoretical training with an emphasis on basic 
principles. Those who undergo this training understand that 
it is not safe to deviate from these principles.'
American Bar Association. Law and National Security 
Intelligenced Report 7 (Feb.1985, No.2):3.
8 Walter C. Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament," The Slavic Review 
(Sept. 1964):505.
9. Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensives," p.186.
10. Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament," p.504.
11. E.A. Korovine, '‘The Soviet Union and Disarmament," 
International Conciliation 292 (Sept.1933):293.
12. Ibid., p.295.
13. Ibid.
110
14. Ibid., p.296.
15. Ibid.
16. Dupuy and Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms 
Control and Disarmament, p.55
17. Korovine, "The Soviet Union and Disarmament," p.298.
18. Maria Salvin, "Soviet Policy Towards Disarmament," 
International Conciliation428 (Feb. 1947):50.
19. Rudzinkski, "Soviet Peace Offensives," p.207.
20. Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament," p.516.
21. Ibid.
22. Korovine, '*Ihe Soviet Union and Disarmament," p.296.
23. Clemens, **Lenin on Disarmament," p.517.
24. Ibid., p.512.
25. Ibid., p.525.
26. Ibid., p.512.
27. Ibid., p.518.
28. Ibid.
v
29 Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensives," p.197.
Ill
Notes to pages 20 to 33
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. Maria Salvin, "Soviet Policy Towards Disarmament", 
International Conciliation 428 (Feb. 1947): 51.
2. Trevor N. Dupuy and G.M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of 
Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Bowker, ±973): 1§3.
3. Allen W. Dulles, "Soviet Attitudes to Disarmament," Foreign 
Affairs 25 (Jan. 1947, No.2): 214.
4. Dupuy and Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms Control 
and Disarmament, p. 186.
5. Ibid., p. 287.
6. Ibid., p. 299.
7. Ibid., p. 342.
8. Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International Control of
Atomic Energy (Indiana; Univ. of Notre Dame Press,
1961;: xiii.
9. Dulles, "Soviet Attitudes to Disarmament," p. 207.
10. Ibid., p. 208.
11. Alexander W. Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensives," 
International Conciliation 490 (April 1953): 189.
12. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New 
Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1983): 6.
13. Ibid.
14. Dulles, "Soviet Attitudes to Disarmament," p. 206.
15. Salvin, "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament," p. 51.
16. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 9.
17. Salvin, "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament," p. 59.
18. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(London: St. Martins Press, 1981): 58.
19. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International Control of 
Atomic Energy, p. 6b.
112
20. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 20.
21. Ibid., p. 27.
22. Freeman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 60.
23. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations 
(New York: Praeger, lVb2)i /2.
24. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 14.
25. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International Control of 
Atomic Energy, p. 138.
26. Dupuy and Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms 
Control and Disarmament, p. 350.
27. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International Control of 
Atomic Energy, p. 2/9.
28. Dupuy and Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms 
Control and Disarmament, p. 293.
29. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 28.
113
Notes to Pages 34 to 55
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.XI (Nov.1959, No.43): 5.
2. Alexander Dallin et al., The Soviet Union and Disarmament.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964): 8.
3. Ibid. See also Stanley Bloomfield, W.C. Clemens Jnr and William 
E. Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge MA:
MIT Press 1966): 17, 138ff. 183ff.
4. Bloomfield et al., Khrushchev ;and the Arms Race, p. 27.
5. B.G. Bechhoeffer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1961): 313.
6. Bloomfield et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race, p. 143.
7. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(London: St. Martini Press, l98l): 20?.
8. Ibid., p. 144.
9. Bloomfield et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race, p. 44.
10. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 153.
11. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Oct. 21, 1960,
No.2): 8 . ------  ----------------------------
12. John Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of 
Disarmament (Indiana: Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1962): 17.
13. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 25.
14. Bechhoeffer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, p. 413.
15. N.H. Mager and J. Katel, eds., Conquest Without War (New York:
Trident Press, 1961): 297.
16. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (New York:
Trident Press, 1970): 493.
17. Mager and Katel, eds., Conquest Without War, p. 269.
18. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 493.
19. Richard Lowenthal, '*End of An Illusion,M Problems of 
Communism 12 (Jan. 1963, No.l): 9.
20. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp 467-470.
114
21. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 208.
22. Ibid, p. 147.
23. Ibid, p. 149.
24. Mager and Katel, eds., Conquest Without War, p. 263.
25. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Oct. 21, 1960,
No.2): 7. Speech to Moscow working people.
26. B.C. Bechhoeffer, f*Ihe Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament," 
Current History 45 (Oct. 1963): 195.
27. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 200.
28. Ibid, p. 21.
29 Ibid.
30. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XV (July 1963,
No.28): 6.
31. Bechhoeffer, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Disarmament", p. 197.
32. Mager and Katel eds., Conquest Without War, p. 205.
33. R.J. Barnet, ,*The Soviet Attitude to Disarmament," Problems 
of Communism X (May-June 1961, No.3): 35.
34. Alan B.Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (New York: 
Praeger, 1963): 69.
35. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XIV (March 1962,
No. 13): 6. --- ------------
36. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 263.
37. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XIII (May 1961, No.20): 23
38. Bechhoeffer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, p. 597.
39. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Arms Control, p. 25.
40. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Feb. 1960, No.2): 9
41. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Arms Control, p. 24
42. Barnet, ’The Soviet Attitude to Disarmament1, p. 33.
43. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Feb. 1960, No.2): 9.
44. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XIII (July 1961, No.27): 9
115
45. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Jan. 1960, No. 5): 
W. Current Digest of the Soviet~Press Vol.XIV (March 1962, No. 
13): T.-------  ---  ----------------
46. Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 200.
47. Ibid., p. 7.
116
Notes to Pages 56 to 71
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge MA:
Harper and Row, 1979,): 243.
2. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements (New Brusnwick: NJ. Transact ion Books, 
1984): 48. ------
3. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New 
Havens Yale Univ. Press, 1983): 89,
4. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements, p. 159.
5. Ibid., p. 133.
6. Samuel B. Payne Jnr, The Soviet Unon and SALT (Cambridge,MA: 
MET Press, 1980): 18.
7. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XVIII (March
29th, 19667 No. 12): 5.---------
8. Holloway, The Soviet Union and Arms Control, p. 83
9. Ground Zero, Nuclear War: What’s in it for You
10. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XXIII (March 30,
I97frN^"l2)ri2:-------------
11. Walter C. Clemens Jnr, "Shifts in Soviet Arms Control Posture" 
Military Review 51 (July 1971): 28.
12. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 11.
13. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 89.
14. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 19
15. Walter C. Clemens Jnr, The Superpowers and Arms Control 
(Lexington MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1973): 82.
16. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 102.
17. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 203.
18. Ibid.
19. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 106.
20. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p.204.
117
21. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 84.
22. Current Digest of Soviet Press Vol.XVIII (November 27th, 
1366, No. 27): 3.-----------
23. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 88.
24. Ibid. p.93.
25. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 75.
26. Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XXII (Dec.l, 1970,
No. 44); 6. ”
27. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 74.
28. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 114.
29. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 85.
30. Current Digest of Soviet Press Vol.XXIII (Nov. 1971,
FT67 "5f): 2-3'. ----------
31. Current Digest of Soviet Press Vol.XXIII (Dec. 1, 1971,
No. 48;: 57
32. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 69.
33. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 118.
34. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 248.
35. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Londons Penguin, 
1981) s 285.-------------- ----------
36. Peter M.E Volten, Brezhnev's Peace Program (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1982;s 162.
37. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 106.
38. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 243.
39. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. 84.
40. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 63.
41. N. Ruggieri, "The Man who made arms control 'respectable'?" 
Foreign Servce Journal Vol.48 (Feb. 1971, No. 2): 15.
42. Volten, Brezhnev's Peace Program, p. 108.
43 Ibid., p. 159.
44. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 204.
118
45. Ibid., p. 205.
46. Current Digest of Soviet Press Vol.XXII (April 1970, 
No. 15): 4. ----------
47. Holloway, Ihe Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 88.
48. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 94.
49. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 91.
50. Ibid., p. 92.
119
Notes to pages 72 to 99
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1 Harry Gelman, 1fcIhe Rise and Fall of Detente”,Problems of 
Communism, (March-April 1985): 65.
2 Strobe Talbott, ,fBuild-up and Breakdown”, Foreign Affairs 
62 (Winter 1983, No. 3): 588.
3 L.J. Caldwell and E.W. Beriz, "Soviet American Diplomacy at the 
End of an Era”, Current Affairs (May 1983): 209.
4 David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, Second Edition 198/;: /4.
5 David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race(New Haven: 
Yale University Press, First Edition 1983): 77
6 Caldwell and Beriz, "Soviet American Diplomacy at the end of an 
Era”, p. 219.
7 Talbott, "Build-up and Breakdown”, p. 591.
8 Arnold Horelick, **US Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms 
Control,” Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984, No 3): 522.
9 Edward P. Haley, "Lessons from Reykjavik”, Orbis 31 (Spring 
1987, No 1): 84.
10 The Economist, September 19th, 1987. p. 13.
11 The Times(London), (December 9th, 1987): 15.
12 The Economist, September 19th 1987. p.13.
13 Ibid.
14 Holloway, Ihe Soviet Union and the Arms Race. (2nd Ed.), p. 68.
15 Jonathan Has lam, The Soviet Union and the Problems of Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe 1969-87 (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1989): 28.
16 Ibid. p. 32.
17 Ibid. p. 30.
18 Ibid. p.60.
19 Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 69-70.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
120
Has lam, The Soviet Union and the Problems of Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe 1969-87,""p.' 60.-------------------  ^ ---
Raymond Garthoff, "The SS-20 Decision,” Survival XV, No 1, Jan/ 
Feb 1983, pp. 110-119. ------
Gelman, f,The Rise and Fall of Detente”, p. 54
Has lam, The Soviet Union and the Problems of Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe 1969-87, p. x.
Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (2nd Ed), p. 71 
Ibid. p. 75.
Ibid. p. 72.
Ibid. p. 79.
Ha slam, The Soviet Union and the Problems of Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe 1959=87; p. 92.---------- ---------------  ----
Ibid. p. 105.
Talbott, "Build-up and Breakdown”, p. 590.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (London: Collins, 1987): pp.239- 
240.
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 19.
Holloway, The Soviet Union and Arms Control, (2nd Ed) P. 173. 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII (Jan
K r i 5O T r 9o"3): 7;--------------
The Times (London), (December 1st, 1987): 1.
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 243.
Has lam, The problems of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 173.
William G. Hyland, flThe Gorbachev Sucession”, Foreign Affairs 
63 (Spring 85, No. 4): 808.
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 203.
Alan B. Sherr, The other side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives 
in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988): 138.
Ibid. p. 162.
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 244-250.
Has lam, The Problems of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 177.
121
44 Boris Rumer, "Soviet Economic Growth", Problems of Communism 
XXXVI (May-June 1986, No. 5): 20.
45 Ibid.
46 Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy", International 
Security 7 (Winter 1982): 172.
47 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 24.
48 Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 169.
49 David A. Dyker, ’’Economic Policy in the USSR, 1986-1987" 
Cambridge: Unpublished paper to NAS EES Annual Conference,
(March 1987), p. 9.
50 Sunday Times, (London: 1st May 1988): A19.
51 Carl Jacobsen, "East West Relations at the Crossroads",
Current History (May 1983): 201.
Also, Caldwell and Beriz, "Soviet American Diplomacy at the end 
of an Era", p. 206.
52 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 219.
53 William Odom,"Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions", 
Problems of Communism XXXVI (July-August 1985, No. 6): 11.
54 In spite of this, a ’boycott-proof* grain export agreement 
was signed with the Reagan Administration in August 1983.
55 Jacobsen, "East-West Relations at the Crossroads", p. 202.
56 The Economist, (London: April 23, 1988): 67.
57 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 220.
58 Ibid, p. 250.
59 Ibid, p. 234
60 Marshall I. Goldman, "Gorbachev and Economic Reform",
Foreign Affairs 64 (Fall 1985, No. 1): 56.
61 Gorbachev, Peres troika, p. 222 p 224.
62 William Mills, "Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Rela­
tions, Political Science Quarterly 101 (Winter 1986, No. 4): 542
63 Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on 
SDI", Problems of Communism XXXVI (March-April 1986,
No 2)CW.
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
122
Robert C. Horn, "Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino-Soviet 
Relations", Orbis 30 (Winter 1987, No. 4): 687.
Mills, "Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Relations", 
p. 535.
Ibid, p. 690.
Ibid.
Ibid. p 553
The Economist, (London: April 23, 1988): 67.
Mills, "Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Relations", 
p. 555. .
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 230.
Ibid, p. 236.
Ibid, p. 218.
Gelman, The Rise and Fall of Detente, p. 64.
Sherr, The other side of Arms Control, p. 158.
Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 250.
123
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Bechhoeffer, B.G.
Bloomfield, Stanley, Clemens 
W.C. Jnr. and Griffiths, 
William E.
Clenens, Walter C. Junior.
Clemens, Walter C.
Dallin, Alexander
Dallin, Alexander, et al
Dupuy Trevor N. and 
Hammerman, G.M.
Dyker, David A.
Freedman, Lawrence 
Gorbachev, Mikhail 
Ground Zero,
Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1961): 313, 413, 597.
Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge 
Mfr" Press, i ,  17, 27, 44, 143,
138ff 133ff.
The Superpowers and Arms Control. 
Lexington MA: D.C Heath 1973.:
xxii, 75, 82, 34, 85.
"Lenin on Disarmament", The Slavic 
Review (Sept. 1964): 504, 505, 512, 
5337517, 518, 525,
The Soviet Union at the United 
Nations (New Vork: Praeger,
19S2:)s 72.
The Soviet Union and Disarmament 
(t*Jew York: thraeger, 1%4): 7, 8, 21, 25, 
200, 263.
A Documentary History of Arms 
Control and Disarmament (Mew York:
BowEer"9 " 197157“  '^752 , 55, 186, 193, 
287, 293, 299, 342, 350.
"Economic Policy in the USSR, 1985- 
1987" Cambridge: Unpublished paper to 
NASEES Annual Conference, (March 1987), 
p. 9.
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(London: 3t. Martini £*ress, i93i): 58, 
60, 85, 144, 147, 149, 153, 207, 208.
Perestroika (London: Collins, 1987): 
19724",”OT, 218, 219, 220, 222, 224, 
230, 234, 236, 239-240, 243, 244-250.
Nuclear War: What*s in it for You.
124
Holloway, David
Holloway, David 
Korovine, E.A.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. 
Kruzel, Joseph
The Soviet Union and the Arms Race 
(tfew Saven, Yale Univ. Press, 1983): 6., 
9, 14, 20, 27, 23, 77, 88, 89, 91, 92, 
93, 102, 106, 114, 118, 169.
The Soviet Union and Arms Control,
p. 83.
"The Soviet Union and Disarmament", 
International Conciliation 292 
(Sept. 1933): 292, 293, 295, 296, 298
Khrushchev Remembers (New York:
Trident Prss, 1^ 76): 467-470, 493.
"Prom Rush-Bagot to SALT: The Lessons of 
Arms Control", Qrbis
Mager, N.H. and Katel J. eds. Conquest Without War (New York:
Nogee, Joseph L.
Nove, Alec 
Payne, Samuel B.
Rudzinski, Alexander W.
Schelling, Thomas C. and 
Halperin, Morton H.
Spanier, John and Nogee, 
Joseph L.
Ulam, Alan B.
c w n w ,Ne
Trident thress;"i%i): 205, 263, 269,
297.
Soviet Policy Toward International 
Control of Atomic Energy (Indiana;
Univ. of Notre Dame thress, 1961): xiii, 
pp 66, 133, 279.
An Economic History of the USSR (London: 
e^nguIn'ri^ i’JT^S.-------
The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, 
m ' Hir",?re“ss7-i980)T,H, 13, 19, 63,
69, 74, 94.
"Soviet Peace Offensives",International 
Conciliation, 490 (April 1953): 177, 
17971^Cr,T56, 189, 197, 207
Strategy and Arms Control (New York, 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961): 2.
The Politics of Disannament
(Indiana: tfotre Dame Univ. Press, 1962):
17.
The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism 
(New ¥ork: Praeger, 1963): 69.
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
(New Brunswick): N.J. Transaction Books, 
1984): 43, 133, 159.
Volten, Peter M.E. Brezhnev's Peace Program (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, i§32): i08, 159, 162.
125
Wolfe, Thomas W. The SALT Experience (Cambridge MA: 
Harper and Row, 1979): 203, 204, 205, 
243, 243.
Periodicals
American Bar Association. Law and National Security Intelligence 
Report' 7 Tra&T"'lW5T No/2): 3. --- 
Barnet, R.J. "The Soviet Attitude to Disarmament"!
Problems of Communism (May-June 1961
ti“ 3)s '33,'35*:----- 
Bechhoeffer, B.G. "Tne Soviet Attitude Toward
P \ 4  e o  »% iv » r\ r i  L J  *iDisarmament", Current History45 (Oct. 
1963): 195, 1971
Caldwell L.J. and Beriz, E.W. "Soviet American Diplomacy at the End of
and Era", Current Affairs (May 
1983): 206,1109, 219.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Oct. 21,1960,
No.2): 5, 6, 7, 8. Speech to Moscow 
working people.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XII (Jan. 1960, NO.5):
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XII (Feb.1960, No. 2):
Current Digest of the Soviet PressVol. XXII (Dec.l, 1970,
No. 44): 6.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XIII (May 1961, No. 20):
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XIII (July 1961, NO. 27):
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XXIII (Nov. 1971),
No. 51): 2-3.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XXIII (Dec. 1, 1971,
No. 43): 5.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XIV (March 1962
No. 13): 6, 7.
Clemens, Walter C. Jnr. "Shifts in Soviet Arms Control Posture"
Military Review51 (July 1971): 28.
126
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol XV, (July 1963,
NoT28): 6.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.XVIII (November
Z7tK, 1966, No. 47): 3.
Current Digest of tne Soviet Press Vol. XVIII (March 29th,
1555, NO. 12): 5.
Current Digest of Soviet Press Vol. XXII (April 1970),
No. 15): 4.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XXIII (March 30, 
--------5---  I97T, No. 12): 12.
Current Digest of trie Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII (Jan. 16
1953, No. 3): 7.
Dulles, Allen, W. 
Gelman, Harry
"Soviet Attitudes to Disarmament", 
Foreign Affairs, 25 :(Jan. 1947, 
208, 214.
"Tne Rise and Fall of Detente", 
Problems of Communism, (March-ApriL
1955):"54,,34;'3T.—
Glaser, Bonnie and Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on SDI",
Problems of CommunismXXXVI 
(^rcf7-Aprn“1956V"Ro. 2): 23.
Banning 
Goldman, Marshall I.
Haley, Edward P. 
Horelick, Arnold
Horn, Robert C.
Hyland, William G. 
Jacobsen, Carl
"Gorbachev and Economic Reform",
Foreign Affairs 64 (Fall 1985, 
t'lo. 1;: 56.
"Lessons from Reykjavk", Orbis 31 
(Spring 1987, No. 1): 34.
"US Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms 
Control", Foreign Affairs 63 
(Winter 1934, "No.^ 1JiT5'22.-
"Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino- 
Soviet Relations", Orbis 30 
(Winter 1987, No. 4): 687.
"The Gorbachev Succession", Foreign 
Affairs 63 (Spring 85, No. 4): 308.
"East West Relations at tne Crossroads", 
Current History (May 1983): 201,
m :  ----
127
Kruzel, Joseph
Lowenthal, Richard 
Mills, William
Olom, William
Rudzinski, Alexander W.
Ruggieri, N.
Rumer, Boris,
Rush, Myron
Salvin, Maria,
Sunday Times,
Talbott, Strobe
The Economist 
The Economist 
The Times
"From Rush-Bagot to SALT: The Lessons of 
Arms Control", Orbis Vol. 30 (Spring 
1986, No. 1): 2HTI
"End of An Illusion", Problems of 
Communisml2 (Jan. 1963, ok). 1:): 9.
"Gorbachev and the Future of the Sino- 
Soviet Relations, Political Science 
Quarterly 101 (Winter 1986, ita. 4):
535V 542; 553, 555, 690.
"Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and 
Directions", Problems of Communism 
XXXVI (July-August 1985, No. 6): 11.
"Soviet Peace Offensives",International 
Conciliation, 490 (April 1053): 1/7, 
1797" 130, 196, 189, 197, 207
"The Man Who Made Arms Control 
*Respectable*?" Foreign Service Journal 
Vol.48 (Feb.1971), No. 2): 15. ’
"Soviet Economic Growth", Problems of 
Communism XXXVI (May-June 1086, No. 5):
"Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy", 
International Security 7 (Winter 1932):
17?:---- ------
"Soviet Policy Towards Disarmament", 
International Conciliation 428 (Feb
i ^ r s ^ r r s s : --------
(London: 1st May 1988): A19.
"Build-up and Breakdown", Foreign 
Affairs b2 (Winter 1983, No. 3 ): 588, 
5957391.
September 19th, 1987, p. 13.
(London: April 23, 1988): 67.
(London), (December 9th 1987): 13.
VITA
ANTHONY DOUGLAS MORRISS
Anthony Douglas Morriss was born in Glastonbury, England on 
October 4, 1961. He was educated at the University of Exeter,
where he was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Social 
Studies with Honours in Economic and Political Development, Class 
2 Division 1, on July 3, 1984. He entered the graduate program in 
Government at William and Mary in August, 1984, and finished his 
coursework there the following May. On March 9, 1991, he was
married to Lizzie Bryant in Sydney, Australia, where he is employed 
by Thomson Financial Networks as an International Analyst.
